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Few topics inspire more heat and less light than integration. A
debate on the topic can cover all manner of subjects including
demographic change, social relationships across ethnic
boundaries, the interaction between race and social class, and
questions of national identity and cultural adherence. As a
consequence, integration has the distinction of being a public
policy question which can become less intelligible the more it
is aired. But these questions aren’t mere debating points: they
have huge potential societal impact.
As this collection reveals, there is a great deal of data out
there on the British integration story, and it shows a varied
picture. On the one hand there is a story of declining
discrimination, an increase in mixed race children, upwardly
mobile minorities and unselfconsciously mixed suburbs. But
elsewhere there is also a story of parallel lives and what Robert
Putnam has called ‘hunkering down’. The real concern about
segregation is two-fold. First, is it likely to undermine social
peace and solidarity? And second, will it deprive any group 
of opportunity, or reduce their life chances? 
Our contributors offer some suggestions. And while it’s
too early to draw too many conclusions, what they say
challenges us to look afresh at the question of ethnic diversity
and its impact on our wellbeing. For this reason, this
collection marks the launch of the Demos Mapping
Integration project, which will have the Integration Hub
website at its heart. This will, when completed, pull together
existing data held by government, academic and private
sector organisations to offer a user-friendly, authoritative and
politically neutral overview of our understanding of these
complex matters. In so doing, it hopes to close the gap
between the ordinary voter and policymakers on a vital but
sensitive subject.
David Goodhart is Director of Demos and leads the Mapping
Integration project.
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1 The story so far and why
it matters
Trevor Phillips
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In the autumn of 2013, two close friends took me and my wife to
see a Bruce Springsteen concert. Neither of us had ever paid too
much attention to the New Jersey rocker, but how could you say
no? Of course, the show, at Wembley Stadium, surpassed our
expectations. He played continuously for over three hours and it
was fantastic. But it was three hours; so there was plenty of time
to look around.
When we tired of marvelling at the Wembley arch, we
looked at the crowd. As you might expect, this was a diverse
audience, with people of all ages dancing up and down the
stadium stairs. But in one respect at least, the 80,000 or so
people at Wembley were similar to each other. So we amused
ourselves by counting the number of people who were not white.
Not one of us got past ten. And we counted me.
For many, this would be the epitome of segregation of the
worst kind – the national stadium given over to an event whose
racial mix would not have embarrassed a KKK rally. But no one
thinks that Bruce is anything but a dyed in the wool liberal, with
impeccable anti-racist credentials. Moreover, if I wanted to get
back with my brethren, I only needed to wait a few hours to go
to my local church on Sunday morning where out of a
congregation of three hundred, the number of people who are
not black can usually be counted on the fingers of one hand.
The fact is that we can all survive this kind of benign
clustering. What we do with our own time, and who we do it
with, should have no impact on public policy. Yet hardly a week
goes by without some controversy about the tendency of one
group or another – Muslims, Poles, Mormons – to do their own
thing. Are they simply exercising legitimate freedoms? Or are
they being unacceptably exclusive? Would we tolerate this
behaviour from other groups?
These aren’t mere debating points. They have huge
potential impact. I have lost count of the number of times I have
been urged to advocate the closure of all Catholic, Anglican and
Jewish schools, partly as a reason to prevent Muslims setting up
‘separatist’ institutions with an Islamic ethos. And one of the
more depressing revelations of recent times has been the
discovery of the widespread use of segregated shifts in industrial
sectors such as meat-packing and agro-business – no doubt
raising productivity at the expense of social mixing.
Few topics inspire more heat and less light than
integration. For a start, an overheard discussion between any
three people will quickly reveal that between them they are
talking about at least four different phenomena. One person may
start by musing about social relations across the lines of
ethnicity, culture, class, religion or age. Another will be thinking
about the concentration or the dispersal of racial groupings in
one district. A third will be wrestling with abstract questions of
values and adherence to national identity.
Our first contributor may then switch to worrying about
the distribution of ethnic groups across the social classes. Our
second contributor might bounce back with some speculation
about whether musical tastes are predictable from ethnic
background or not. And our third might come down out of the
clouds asking about the extent to which people of African,
Jewish or Pakistani heritage born in Britain are now choosing
anglicised Christian names for their offspring, and whether this
represents a true proxy for integration.
Each will recount tales of encounters between groups of
people from different backgrounds, usually told as narratives
culminating in varying degrees of triumph or disaster. Debates
about integration can be guaranteed to generate a veritable
spider’s web of cross-purposes. As a consequence, integration has
the peculiar distinction of being one of those public policy
questions which becomes less intelligible the more they are aired.
It also leads to intelligent folk making preposterous
correlations. One of the most common assertions, repeated
recently in the Economist, is that integration in the UK is in rude
health. That may or not be true. But the usual indicator of the
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validity of this statement – rates of intermarriage, or an increase
in the number of mixed-race babies – just won’t do for anyone
who takes the question seriously.
Marginally increased rates of intermarriage may reflect
nothing more significant than the fact that minorities are a larger
proportion of the population. Or that some groups have moved
into greater geographical proximity. Or just that the number of
eccentrics (like me) who choose to spend their lives with people
unlike their own families has nudged up a little.
Either way, what the happy-clappy integrationist usually
ignores is the fact that the most frequent instance of
intermarriage in Britain takes place between people of African
Caribbean and White British heritage (once again, like me).
Inconveniently for optimists, this is also the type of union most
likely to produce children who will grow up with just one parent
in their home. It takes some imagination to turn this into an
indicator of healthy social relationships.
The topic deserves better than this. In fact, as a society, we
all need better than this. The standing of, and relations between,
different groupings is a vital aspect of the health of increasingly
diverse societies. Indeed, the presence or absence of diversity in a
society may in itself become a critical determinant of its
economic and social success.
Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has identified the
nation’s historic monoculturalism and masculinism as part of 
the explanation for its twenty-five year period of economic
stagnation. His promotion of so-called ‘womenomics’ – an
attempt to bring women into the labour market – has generated
some popular resistance. Tentative suggestions that Japanese
higher education might benefit from attracting international
students have been treated as though Abe had proposed selling
off the Chrysanthemum Throne to the highest bidder. No
Japanese politician has yet had the nerve to suggest that the 
best solution to Japan’s shrinking workforce – the oldest in 
the world – may not be sleek new robots, but lively, creative,
young immigrants.
Both Abe and his critics are, however, in their own ways,
right. Japan’s long period of stagnation has shown that, without
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social diversity, societies lack energy and inventiveness. Yet, its
mirror image, in this respect, is the USA, where social diversity
has both invested the nation with an extraordinary vibrancy, as
well as proving to be the source of strife and division. Neither
the Americans, nor the Japanese, two of the most successful
nations in history, have yet found the key to reconciling diversity
and social cohesion.
But the need to get this right has never been more pressing.
In our own society, whatever anyone thinks about our current
levels of immigration, it is incontestable that even our past
immigration flows have presented us with a need to make sure
that relations between different ethno-cultural groupings tend
towards the harmonious rather than the indifferent or hostile.
But how do we know if they are better or worse overall, if
we can’t even agree what elements of the relationship matters?
The real concern about segregation is two-fold. First, is it
likely to undermine social peace and solidarity? And second, will
it deprive any group of opportunity, or reduce their life chances?
In this series of essays, our contributors offer some
pointers. And while it’s far too early in our work to draw too
many conclusions, what they say challenges us to look afresh at
the question of social diversity and its impact on our well-being.
Take three examples:
Eric Kaufmann’s (see Chapter 10) account of his recent
study of population movement in and out of the capital tells us
that whites have indeed escaped the inner city in numbers – but
that they aren’t being driven by the old-fashioned bigotry of
bygone generations. So does this instance of ‘white flight’ pass
the Springsteen test for benign clustering – or is it something
that needs the intervention of public policy?
Rich Harris (see Chapter 2) wisely counsels against reducing
the idea of integration to a simple snapshot of residential patterns,
any of which can be interpreted to support very different
hypotheses; his analysis tells us that what appear to be opposing
interpretations of data can actually be entirely consistent with
each other – in this case, it is entirely possible for minority
groups to be less isolated (from each other) at exactly the same
time as they become more separate (from the ethnic majority).
The story so far and why it matters
And Shamit Saggar (see Chapter 7) warns against
imagining that the absence of social integration is mostly a
matter for the less educated and poorer sections of society – a
view which resonates with me. During my time at the CRE, 
the people who were most visibly aggrieved about racial
discrimination were not unemployed young black men; they
were senior doctors who felt they should have been consultants,
experienced barristers who had been denied silk and lecturers
who were passed over for professorial tenure – all people 
who felt they had done everything that white society asked 
them to do, yet were excluded from the normal rewards for 
their diligence.
Perhaps the most important thing that we can learn 
is that integration, as Simon Burgess (see Chapter 6) points 
out, is a process rather than a still picture. In my opinion, it is
best thought of as a process of convergence between groups – 
in attainment, in behaviours and in cultures. Thinking of
integration as this kind of convergence means that we can 
specify the direction of travel and measure its pace. It also 
holds open the possibility of being able to influence the course
of the convergence.
Second, as many of our contributors suggest, the integra-
tion process does not inevitably end up stuck in one-way traffic.
Both minorities and majorities will move – how much and how
fast may differ, but everyone changes.
Third, there is no automatic presumption that all right-
thinking people will see the process of integration as being in 
the interests of themselves or their families. You do not have to
be a wild-eyed fanatic or an ethnic separatist to believe that 
some degree of clustering is good for you (as Michael Merry
points out in Chapter 12).
For example, when my parents arrived in London in the
early 1950s, they found that no-one would rent them any property
other than a rat-infested Rachman slum. They managed to raise
the money for a deposit on their first home through a ‘box’ – a
simple form of credit union organised by West Indians, often
based on their concentration in particular workplaces (they were
common in the Post Office, where my father worked as a sorter).
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Every member contributes a fixed amount – called
‘throwing box-hand’. All the weekly savings are drawn by each
member of the club in turn. If you didn’t need your turn, you’d
leave it in the box; so over time, an amount of capital could be
built up. The scheme could only have existed within a close-knit
community where people had the confidence that their hard-
earned contributions will be protected – if only because anyone
who cheated would be cast out of the tribe forever, quickly
followed by their relatives.
So integration is by no means a simple process to describe,
nor to manage. On the other hand it is not organic; it does not
happen by accident. To make it work, we need to know more
about when and where it matters and, where necessary, how to
encourage constructive convergence. The project we call
Mapping Integration has set as its target a better understanding
of integration, its value, its risks and its benefits. And what we
also hope to do is to find ways of quantifying the process by
measuring the degrees of convergence of attainment, behaviours
and culture over time.
This set of essays is the first step in our consideration of
how to establish how far we’ve come, and how far we have still 
to go.
Trevor Phillips OBE is a former Chair of the Equality and Human
Rights Commission and Chair of the Mapping Integration project at
Demos.
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2 Evidence and trends: are
we becoming more
integrated, more
segregated or both?
Rich Harris
15
As data from the 2011 Census for England and Wales began to
emerge at the end of 2012 two somewhat conflicting stories
emerged with them. Reports of white flight, white avoidance and
ethnic cliffs were accompanied by counterclaims of decreased
segregation, more mixed neighbourhoods and the integration of
the population at the most intimate levels, (the number of
people classifying themselves as of mixed or multiple ethnicity
almost doubled in the ten years between 2001 and 2011, now
forming 2.3 per cent of the population).1 
Debates about segregation remain emotive. The mayor of
Newham announced recently plans to boost integration and
prevent ‘apartheid’.2 Meanwhile, a member of the Society of
Black Lawyers claimed ‘we do not have segregation in any shape
or form in the UK’.3 Additionally, debates about segregation and
integration have dovetailed with those about immigration. The
two are not unrelated—the tendency for new immigrants to live
in communities with their ethno-cultural peers is well
documented.4 However, one does not subsume the other. 
In London, where less than half the population classed them-
selves as White British, three-quarters of the population are
British citizens.5 
Residential trends
Between 2001 and 2011, the number of White British residents in
England fell from 42 747 136 to 42 279 236, a 1.1 per cent
decrease. That provides a benchmark to evaluate changes in
individual local authorities, here confining the analysis to
England. Of 326 local authorities, 113 had a fall in their White
British population of greater than 1.1 per cent. All 32 of the
London boroughs plus the City of London are among these. For
London as a whole, the average decrease in the White British
population was 14 per cent from 2001 to 2011, of which the
greatest decreases were in Newham (37 per cent), Barking and
Dagenham (31 per cent), and Redbridge (30 per cent). Outside
London, the greatest decreases were in Slough (30 per cent) and
Luton (24 per cent).
In general, the greatest decreases were from places that had
the highest proportions of the population not White British in
2001. The correlation between the percentage decrease and the
proportion of the population not White British in 2001 is
between 0.67 and 0.82 for the 113 local authorities. It is
statistically significant, showing that decreases in the White
British population tended to be greatest in areas where other
groups already were well established.
As the White British have decreased in London and other
parts of the country, the numbers of other ethnic groups have
increased. In the same 113 local authorities with above the overall
English rate of White British loss, the Indian population has
increased by an average of 56 per cent (compared to a 36 per
cent growth for all of England), the Pakistani population by 66
per cent (vs. 57 per cent), the Bangladeshi population by 111 per
cent (vs. 59 per cent), the Black African population by 255 per
cent (vs. 105 per cent) and the Black Caribbean population by 27
per cent (vs. 5 per cent).
The local authorities with the highest percentage of White
British population are Allerdale (in Cumbria), and Redcar and
Cleveland, both at 97.6 per cent (a decrease from 98.4 per cent
and 97.9 per cent in 2001). For the Indian population, the
authority with the highest percentage is Leicester (28.3 per cent,
increased from 25.7 per cent); for Pakistanis, Bradford (20.4 per
cent, increased from 14.5 per cent); for Bangladeshis, Tower
Hamlets (32.0 per cent, decreased from 33.4 per cent); Black
Africans, Southwark (16.4 per cent, increased from 16.1 per cent);
and for Black Caribbeans, Lewisham (11.2 per cent, increased
from 9.1 per cent).
Evidence and trends
Greater presence within an authority does not mean the
ethnic group is rooted to it. In fact, 7.0 per cent of the total
Indian population of England lived in Leicester in 2001; by 2011,
its share was 6.7 per cent. In 2001, 8.3 per cent of Black Africans
were in Southwark; in 2011, 4.8 per cent. In 2001, 5.4 per cent of
all Black Caribbeans were in Lewisham; 5.2 per cent in 2011. The
percentage of the total Pakistani population in Bradford was
unchanged at 9.6 in 2001 and 2011.
Confusingly, a group can be both more concentrated
within its traditional location centres (forming a greater
percentage of those locations’ total population) while at the
same time becoming more geographically spread out (so that
within the historic centres the share of the group’s total number
falls). Evidence this is happening is gleaned by looking at the
Census small area data. These are the data for Output Areas
(OAs), the smallest areas for which the data currently are
published (but possibly not in the future if Government
proposals to replace the Census come to pass with all that entails
about the loss of information about the social and demographic
make-up of the country).
What we can ask is what is the smallest proportion of all
OAs that, when selected together, contain half of an ethnic
group’s total number? The larger the proportion, the more
spread-out the group is geographically. The interest is in whether
that proportion increased from 2001 to 2011.
For all but the White British group, the measure of
geographical spread does indeed increase (see Table 1). A
majority of Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Black Africans and
Black Caribbeans are more geographically dispersed in 2011 than
they were in 2001. However, the story is actually a little more
complicated than that. When interpreting the changes, we need
to take the size of the group into consideration since all but the
White British group have grown in number over the period.
Note, for example, that the measure of spread increases by 42.9
per cent for Pakistanis from 2001 to 2011. Yet, the group’s
population count grew by 57.4 per cent over the same period.
The group has not expanded geographically at the same rate it
has grown in number. The same is especially true of the Black
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African group. Only the Black Caribbeans have become more
geographically dispersed than their growth in number would
anticipate. In contrast, the White British have become more
geographically concentrated.
More or less segregation?
Commentators have debated whether the UK is becoming more
ethnically integrated or divided. However, the sorts of
segregation measures used in academic research all point in the
same direction: ethnic segregation – the separation of different
ethnic groups into different neighbourhoods – is falling.6 Table
2 shows this with the most commonly used measure: the
segregation or dissimilarity index. It is calculated for the six
largest ethnic groups at three scales of analysis: London alone,
London and all local authorities within 100 kilometres of it, and
the whole of England. The index is interpreted on a scale
ranging from 0 (no segregation) to 1 (complete separation of a
group from all others).
Looking at Table 2, we discern three things. First, levels of
ethnic separation remain strong in 2011, especially for the
Bangladeshi group. However, and secondly, the index of
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Table 1 Geographical distribution across England, and the growth or
decline in number, of the six largest ethnic groups in 2001 and
2011
Measure of % Population count % 
geographical change change
spread
2001 2011 2001 2011
Indians 0.031 0.042 +35.5 1028546 1395702 +35.7
Pakistanis 0.014 0.020 +42.9 706539 1112282 +57.4
Bangladeshis 0.009 0.014 +55.6 275394 436514 +58.5
Black Africans 0.030 0.051 +70.0 475938 977741 +105.4
Black Caribbeans 0.042 0.049 +16.7 561246 591016 +5.3
White British 0.400 0.379 -5.3 42747136 42279236 -1.1
segregation has fallen at all scales for all but the White British
group. Thirdly, the levels of separation in London are lower than
for it plus surrounding local authorities, and for England as a
while. London is a multicultural city.
If the figures are clear – residential segregation is, on
average, falling – why the debate? The clue is the rise in
segregation value for the White British. The increase is slight but
relates to the residential choices of the largest number of people.
Two maps will illustrate the contrasting sides of the debate.
The first (Figure 1) shows where the White British population
has increased or decreased in number in London and
surrounding authorities. Areas shaded white have more White
British living in them in 2011 than they did in 2001. Those
shaded grey have less, with darker shading indicating a greater
percentage loss. The pattern is stark: the urban centres have lost
White British population while the rural areas have gained.
Figure 2 provides an alternative view. It shows where the
number of non-White British to White British population has
increased or decreased between the censuses. For example, a
value of two means that the non- to White British population has
doubled. Any value above one means the location is becoming
more ethnically mixed. A value less than one means it is
becoming more White British – a situation that is true of only
one local authority, Forest Heath in Suffolk.
We reach the following conclusions. The White British
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Table 2 Levels of segregation by ethnic group in London, London
and surrounding local authorities, and England as a whole
Greater London London + 100 km England
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
Indians 0.522 0.511 -0.011 0.606 0.560 -0.046 0.685 0.634 -0.051
Pakistanis 0.573 0.553 -0.020 0.719 0.677 -0.042 0.789 0.755 -0.034
Bangladeshis 0.711 0.661 -0.050 0.804 0.732 -0.072 0.875 0.798 -0.077
Black Africans 0.464 0.426 -0.038 0.667 0.576 -0.091 0.772 0.663 -0.109
Black Caribbeans 0.456 0.425 -0.031 0.644 0.599 -0.045 0.715 0.674 -0.041
White British 0.374 0.384 +0.010 0.527 0.528 +0.001 0.563 0.564 +0.001
population has declined in the urban centres, centres that have
and continue to contain the greatest presence of other ethnic
groups. The places where the White British have increased are
those where the other ethnic groups have, historically, been
under-represented. However, those places, too, are becoming
more ethnically mixed. The net result is a geographical
contraction of the White British population but also increasingly
diverse neighbourhoods.
A note on schools
A proper understanding of integration within society cannot rest
with an analysis of residential geographies. Segregation or
Evidence and trends
Figure 1 Increases and decreases in the White British population
in London and surrounding local authorities from 
2001 to 2011
otherwise occurs across the duration of a person’s life course, of
which an early stage is the school they attend. Table 3 forms part
of on-going research at the Centre for Market and Public
Organisation, University of Bristol (see Chapter 6). It shows
segregation values by ethnic group for year 11 pupils in 2013 at
the three scales of analysis. The columns headed ‘actual’ are the
true values. The columns headed ‘hypo.’ are the hypothetical
values obtained if each pupil attended their nearest school. In
nearly all cases, to attend the nearest school would be to reduce
the levels of ethnic separation but not for Black Caribbeans in
London and its surrounds (a likely consequence of the
preference of this group for faith schools).
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Figure 2 Increases in number of non-White British to White British
population (values greater than one) or decreases
(values less than one) from 2001 to 2011
For comparison, the segregation values for Output Areas in
2011 are repeated from Table 1. In most cases, the residential
separations are greater than the school-based ones, although not
for the White British, nor for the Indians, Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis in London’s schools, and not for the Indians or
Black Caribbeans for England as a whole. However, the
comparison is not exact. The Census population includes all age
groups, not just a single cohort of the school-aged. There are also
57 times more OAs than there are schools – the greater diversity
in schools is largely inevitable.
Conclusions
The complexity of demographic trends means that different tales
can be told using the same sources of data. We can, for instance,
focus on the stark reduction of the White British population
from particular parts of England or we could argue that other
ethnic groups are becoming more geographically dispersed with
neighbourhoods becoming more mixed as a consequence.
The evidence is that England was less ethnically segregated
in 2011 than it was in 2001 but the reasons for and the
consequences of the White British loss in some urban centres,
especially London, requires further study. Moreover, numeric
decreases in segregation indices need not map to greater
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Table 3 Levels of segregation in secondary schools compared to
pupils attending their nearest school and compared to
neighbourhoods
Greater London London + 100 km England
schools OAs schools OAs schools OAs
actual hypo 2011 actual hypo 2011 actual hypo 2011
Indians 0.550 0.508 0.511 0.549 0.517 0.560 0.662 0.647 0.634
Pakistanis 0.569 0.517 0.553 0.604 0.572 0.677 0.743 0.740 0.755
Bangladeshis 0.664 0.634 0.661 0.666 0.635 0.732 0.738 0.724 0.798
Black Africans 0.336 0.318 0.426 0.418 0.411 0.576 0.660 0.645 0.663
Black Caribbeans 0.400 0.406 0.425 0.487 0.493 0.599 0.706 0.700 0.674
White British 0.477 0.458 0.384 0.546 0.539 0.528 0.565 0.557 0.564
integration in any socially meaningful sense (though it might). I
leave it to others to discuss what is meant by integration, whether
it is happening on the ground, the barriers to it being so and
what we can learn from those places and institutions that have
tackled the issues.
Rich Harris is a Reader in Quantitative Geography at the University 
of Bristol.
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3 Attitudes of majority and
minority
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Discussions about integration in Britain cannot avoid a focus on
what we think, and how we feel, about each other, and the
extent to which we believe we have common norms and a sense
of mutual interest. This in turn is reflected in the emphasis on
‘lived experience’ and ‘everyday integration’ in most recent
discussions of integration.
But things get slippery when we try to measure these. This
shouldn’t be a huge surprise – even apparently objective factors
on integration, such as whether communities are more or less
physically segregated, lead to fierce debates of definition and
interpretation.
And it’s worse with subjective measures. There are firstly
straightforward measurement problems: it is very difficult to get
at ‘lived experience’ in structured surveys. This is much more
the realm of qualitative or observational research – but these
have limitations in representativeness and generalisability. This
is one of the reasons why the study of integration is cursed by
anecdote and personal experience: the testimony of individuals
or single communities may be compelling, but tell us little about
how the whole of the country is feeling. And on the other hand,
survey responses give us a very shallow understanding of what
people really think on this issue.
There are also significant conceptual issues – we’re not
sure what we’re looking for, particularly as this is new territory
for us in Britain with our multiculturalist history and official
‘laissez-faire’ approach to integration. As one of the most useful
recent reviews notes:
Crucially, the central principle has shifted towards a loosely framed public
acceptance that migrants themselves must change outlooks and behaviours
in order to ‘fit in’. In many other western democracies this may not be
novel, let alone challenging. In Britain today it represents a substantive
move away from the past.1
Attitudes of majority and minority
There are at least three dimensions to measuring attitudinal
integration in practice, each related but distinct. Firstly, there is
research on ‘values convergence’ or ‘normative integration’,
which has a much more extensive and longstanding track record
in continental Europe. These studies tend to focus on how
‘modern’ or ‘liberal’ attitudes are among immigrant or minority
communities and compare them with the majority, tracking
whether they get closer over time.2
This is different from a second common area of question-
ing, which asks directly for our views of multiculturalism, 
and whether people prefer diversity or uniformity of values 
and attitudes.
And this is related, but different again, from our sense of
‘social cohesion’, which is more focused on the extent to which
people think their communities are working well.
Looking at each in turn paints a varied picture of both
majority and minority views.
Values convergence – but not completely
On a number of measures of values, there is a clear tendency
towards convergence, where recently-arrived minorities move
towards the majority view over time.
So, for example, when we compare trust in institutions 
like the local council and Parliament between groups, the 
native population have much lower levels of trust than 
immigrant populations.3 So for example, just 30 per cent of the
native born population with native parents say they trust
Parliament, in contrast with 70 per cent of recent immigrants
from outside Europe.
But this difference shrinks over time, and longer-standing
non-European immigrants (who have been here more than seven
years) are much less trusting: 53 per cent say they trust
Parliament. The picture is similar for European immigrants:
recent European arrivals start closer to native Brits (57 per cent
say they trust Parliament) and end up closer still (just 42 per cent
of those who’ve been here 7 or more years trust Parliament).
Of course, this also illustrates one of the perversities of
using values convergence as a measure of ‘success’: do we 
want minorities to converge on the more disillusioned outlook 
of the majority?
There is also some convergence on views of freedom of
speech – but again also maintained difference. Two-thirds of the
majority native-born/native-parent population agree that people
should be free to say what they believe even if it offends others.
European immigrants arrive with an even greater sense of the
importance of this, with 77 per cent agreeing – but over time
move towards the majority (with 66 per cent agreeing after seven
years). But immigrants from outside Europe start with lower
levels of agreement and this doesn’t shift – only around half
believe in this conception of free speech, regardless of how long
they’ve been in Britain.
And there are other instances where values stay different. In
particular, as we might expect, there are big differences on
maintaining ethnic traditions: just 16 per cent of the native
population agree that this is important, which is similar to levels
seen among European immigrants (20 per cent). However, 43
per cent of non-European recent immigrants agree, and this only
goes down to 34 per cent for longer-term immigrants. In
particular, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indians and Black Africans
who were born abroad are more likely to have different views,
and keep these for longer.
So while minority and majority values do converge, many
stay different. But we need to remember that the population is
riven with values splits on many other characteristics. To pick
just one, there are massive differences in generational values on
subjects that are often picked out as signals of religious and
cultural minorities’ difference. For example, 37 per cent of the
pre-1945 generation still believe that sexual relations between
two adults of the same sex are ‘always wrong’, which is over
twice the level of every other generation (15 per cent).
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Doubting multiculturalism
Measuring attitudes to ‘multiculturalism’ more directly is
treacherous, as the term itself is nebulous. There also appears to
be a distinction in views between multiculturalism as a policy
(where views are very negative) and the multicultural nature of
our society (where opinion is more balanced).
For example, even by 2008, seven in ten of the total
population (including a majority of minority populations)
thought that ‘multiculturalism’, which was defined in this
question as the protection or promotion of minority cultures,
wasn’t working and causing more separation. But in contrast, in
more recent polling, 54 per cent say that it’s a strength of Britain
that it’s a more multicultural society than it used to be (36 per
cent disagree). But all of these questions need to be treated with
caution, as terms and timeframes are typically undefined.4
Much more useful then are questions that try to get to ideas
behind multiculturalism, without using the terms – and here
there is a clear trend of increasing doubt.
For example, we have seen a weakening of agreement that
we should respect the wishes of minority communities over
recent years. There was still a clear majority who agreed with this
in 2008, but it was down to 64 per cent from 85 per cent in 1999.
Similarly, agreement that it’s a good thing that foreigners keep
their lifestyles when they come to Britain declined from 36 per
cent to 22 per cent over the same period – and there was a
doubling of the proportion who strongly disagreed with this.
Each of these studies is too small to compare majority and
minority views in great depth – but the pattern is consistent:
minorities are more supportive of keeping native cultures than
the majority population, but often not markedly so.
This is seen in our 2012 polling for British Future, in a
question that asks how the children of immigrants should
prioritise the culture of their parents’ country of origin compared
with British culture. The most popular response among the
population as a whole is that the cultures should be combined
(51 per cent), with the next most being they should prioritise
British culture (37 per cent): only 2 per cent say they should
prioritise the culture from their parents’ country of origin. The
views of minority groups do differ: those born outside the UK
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and from minority ethnic groups are around half as likely to say
British culture should be prioritised. But there is no real 
appetite for prioritisation of foreign cultures either: only around
5 per cent across these groups say that the parents’ culture
should take priority.
So overall we don’t want everyone to be the same, but are
increasingly likely to want greater integration – although we also
find these difficult questions to answer. For example, when asked
to pick what’s closest to our views, 41 per cent say we should
share a common culture and set of values in Britain, while just 26
per cent say we should celebrate the rich diversity of cultures and
values between different groups in Britain – but 30 per cent put
themselves somewhere in between.
But is social cohesion holding up?
Given these doubts about multiculturalism, and that the values
of minorities do not completely integrate with the majority, we
may expect to have seen declines in measures of social cohesion
as the minority population has grown – but we don’t.
Large, robust surveys show levels of belonging to
neighbourhoods, local areas and Britain have all increased in
recent years. For example, our sense of belonging to our
neighbourhoods increased from 70 per cent to 78 per cent
between 2003 and 2011 and belonging to Britain increased from
85 per cent to 89 per cent over the same period. There are
differences between minority and majority groups, with those of
Asian ethnic origin slightly more likely to say they feel they
belong, while Black groups are slightly lower – but there are no
huge differences in levels or in trends. Analysis shows that
minority views on this are dynamic, as with other values: recent
immigrants are less likely to feel they belong, but longer-term
immigrants actually have a greater sense of belonging than
native residents.
And it’s the same with perceptions of whether people from
different backgrounds get on well together and whether people
respect ethnic differences. Both of these measures see high levels
of agreement, and each have been on the up, with, for example,
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86 per cent agreeing that different backgrounds get on 
well together in 2011, and just about all ethnic groups 
showing an increase.
However, these positive patterns appear to contrast
strongly with questions that encourage a direct comparison with
the past, and particularly where they link directly to
immigration. For example, seven in ten say they are concerned
that Britain is becoming increasingly divided because of
immigration (the highest level seen among the seven European
countries in the study). This probably tells us more about
attitudes to immigration than cohesion as such: a solid two-
thirds have said there are too many immigrants or we’re in
‘danger of being swamped’ by other cultures all the way back to
the 1970s.
But the pace of change is a very real concern for a large
minority of the majority population. In the 2000s, we saw a
doubling in the proportion who said that their neighbourhood
‘doesn’t feel like Britain any more’ because of immigration, from
12 per cent to 25 per cent. And more recently, in Lord Ashcroft’s
polling on immigration, 36 per cent say their area has changed
for the worse because of immigration. If nothing else, this shows
the measurement challenges of understanding our views of
integration: question context has a huge effect.
A more meaningful picture of majority concern is therefore
probably seen in the shifting patterns of perceptions of
discrimination. Firstly, there have been some remarkable
improvements in perceptions of discrimination among minorities
– just 15 per cent of minority ethnic groups felt they would be
discriminated against by the criminal justice system by 2011, less
than half the level (36 per cent) a decade earlier. In contrast,
there are stubbornly static views of discrimination among white
groups on housing allocation: in fact, these have increased
slightly to 20 per cent of white people feeling they’d be
discriminated against on housing because of their ethnicity in
2011, up from 15 per cent in 2001. In contrast, perceptions of
discrimination on housing have halved among minority ethnic
groups to 6 per cent over the same period.
Attitudes of majority and minority
Our shaky sense of ourselves
This mixed and contingent attitudinal picture on integration
perhaps reflects our shaky sense of identity and what we’re
expecting minorities to integrate into. The largest single answer
to survey questions that ask what we understand by the ‘British
way of life’ is ‘don’t know’. And when prompted with a list of what
makes us proud, it tends to be objective factors like our history
and the NHS. Our values are an odd mix of civic behaviours
(respect for the law) and character traits (sense of humour). The
eclectic opening ceremony at the London Olympics could have
been based on a checklist from survey responses.
But one common feature throughout most of these
questions on how we define ourselves is the emphasis we place
on our tolerance of difference. This, combined with relatively
strong pride in our identity but weak understanding of its basis,
helps explain some of the contradictions and nuances in our
views. Our attitudes to integration, majority and minority alike,
are a very British compromise.
Bobby Duffy is the Managing Director of the Ipsos MORI Social
Research Institute.
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‘See that man over there?
Yes.
Well, I hate him.
But you don’t know him.
That’s why I hate him.’
The social psychologist Gordon Allport used this parable in his
classic volume, The Nature of Prejudice (1954), to illustrate the role
that ignorance can play in prejudice towards members of other
social groups, and to argue why ‘intergroup contact’ involving
members of different and often opposed groups was a powerful
weapon against that prejudice.1
Contrary to some claims, we do not appear to be
‘sleepwalking to segregation’, at least as measured by most
geographers’ analyses of what is happening in our major cities.
Yet, even if ethnic minorities are spreading out more evenly
across Britain, rather than being isolated in enclaves, this may
sometimes reflect mere desegregation, but stop short of true
integration. The difference is crucial.
In an influential article published in 2007, Harvard
political scientist Robert D. Putnam argued that ethnic diversity
has negative consequences for trust.2 He suggested that diversity
poses a threat, to which people respond by ‘hunkering down’.
He reported in a large US survey that people living in diverse
neighbourhoods not only trusted members of other ethnic
groups less, but also trusted members of their own group less,
compared with people living in less diverse areas. But Putnam’s
research focused only on the proportions of different ethnic
groups in an area. This can be considered a measure of mere
‘opportunity for contact’, but not whether actual contact takes
place, how often and, most important, what the quality of that
contact is. He also did not measure the threat that he argued was
posed by diversity.
We recently conducted research aimed at challenging
Putnam’s pessimistic conclusions.3 Compared with prior research
in this contentious area there were three special aspects of our
research design. First, we purposefully sampled respondents
from a wide variety of neighbourhoods, ranging from low to
high on diversity, and low to high on deprivation (because
deprivation, which often overlaps with diversity, is itself a
primary driver of lower levels of trust). Second, we considered
three different measures of trust (trust in members of one’s
ethnic ingroup; trust in ethnic outgroup members; and trust in
neighbours), and controlled for attitudes towards members of
ethnic outgroups. Third, we included measures of positive
contact, that is, instances of face-to-face interaction across ethnic
group lines. Our survey covered a wide range of English
neighbourhoods (with 868 White British majority respondents
from 218 neighbourhoods, and a targeted oversampling of 798
ethnic minority respondents from 196 neighbourhoods) and was
carried out by Ipsos MORI.
Our results supported our contention that Putnam’s
original conclusions had been too negative, and that contact
provided the missing link. We did reveal some negative effects of
diversity, similar to those noted by Putnam and others, but only
when we did not consider people’s contact experiences.4 For
White British majority respondents diversity had negative direct
effects on trust of ethnic minorities and neighbours. Thus living
in more ethnically diverse neighbourhoods was directly
associated with lower trust of ethnic outgroup members and
lower neighbourhood trust, but not with either trust for ingroup
members or attitudes towards members of ethnic outgroups.
There were, however, no parallel negative effects among the
ethnic minority sample; thus for ethnic minority respondents 
a higher probability of encountering a White British person 
in the neighbourhood did not exert any direct effects on trust 
or attitudes.
Next, we looked at whether diversity exerted any indirect
effects via contact and threat. For both groups, we found that
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diversity was consistently associated with more contact, and
contact with lower threat. This then resulted in diversity being
indirectly, and positively, associated with greater trust for
members of one’s ingroup, members of ethnic outgroups, and
neighbours. When we then considered the overall effects of
diversity we did not, by and large, witness negative effects of
diversity. Our results thus suggest that the positive indirect
effects via contact cancelled out any initial negative direct effects
of diversity on trust.
This impact of contact came as no surprise. A meta-analysis
of over 500 studies on intergroup contact (published by Thomas
F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp in 2006) revealed beyond doubt
that positively-toned contact is negatively related to prejudice, an
effect that occurs across different social groups (including
groups based on ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation),
settings (neighbourhoods, schools, and work places) and a raft
of outcomes.5 More refined research has also shown how contact
works – by reducing anxiety, promoting empathy, and improving
knowledge – and when – when we see outgroup partners as true
representatives of their groups, rather than ‘exceptions’.
Two further developments have shown that the potential of
contact is even greater than we originally thought. First,
notwithstanding the evidence that direct, face-to-face contact
works, it is limited by our opportunities for contact. This is
where extended contact comes in – we are influenced by knowing
or observing that fellow members of our ingroup have outgroup
friends. Research has consistently shown that, controlling for
levels of direct or face-to-face contact, people who know, or
observe, fellow ingroup members with outgroup friends have
lower levels of prejudice. This effect can be explained, in part, by
changing our perceived norms about what kinds of behaviour
(e.g. mixing) are socially approved by valued others.6
A second development concerns so-called ‘secondary
transfer’ effects of contact. Perhaps the most impressive evidence
that contact matters comes from recent studies showing that
contact with one outgroup reduces prejudice towards other
outgroups. We have shown, for example, that for Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland, contact with the other
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community is associated with reduced prejudice towards racial
minorities measured one year later.7
And in a unique cross-sectional sample of the general
population drawn from eight European countries (with 
7042 respondents), we demonstrated the relationship between
intergroup contact with immigrants, and attitudes towards 
not only immigrants, but also two quite unrelated outgroups
(Jews and homosexuals).8 This form of generalisation shows 
that contact can be a very efficient and powerful means of
improving intergroup relations in increasingly diverse and
cosmopolitan societies.
Steven Vertovec has coined the term ‘super-diversity’ to
refer to areas such as Newham and Haringey in London, which
are home to people from hundreds of different ethnic back-
grounds.9 In such settings contact would be of limited value 
if it merely transferred from meeting members of one ethnic
outgroup to attitudes towards only that outgroup. Instead, 
it generalises across groups. Contact helps people to become
better cosmopolitans.
‘Why can’t we live together?’ asked Timmy Thomas in a
famous song. The answer is that we can and do; and where we
do, positive contact is the essential glue of integration.
Miles Hewstone is Professor of Social Psychology and Fellow of New
College, Oxford University. Katharina Schmid is a research fellow at the
Department of Experimental Psychology and lecturer in Psychology at
New College, Oxford University. They gratefully acknowledge the support
of the Leverhulme Trust for our Research Programme Grant, ‘Ethno-
religious diversity and social trust in residential and educational
settings’, as well as the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Religious
and Ethnic Diversity, Germany.
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It is clear that Britain is becoming an increasingly diverse
country. However, much is missed in that short statement.
Firstly, ethnicity is a large part of this story (according to
Migration Observatory, Britain is set to become the second most
ethnically diverse country in the OECD by 2050) but it is only
one part. It is as much about age diversity; an ageing population
and high birth rate mean that forty years from now half of our
population will be either a teen or a pensioner.
It is also about income diversity; globalisation of labour
and the increasing ability of computers to replace low-income
jobs are likely to further increase the gap between rich and poor.
Secondly, just as significant as the increase in diversity, has been
the decline in institutions that bring together and mix people of
different ages, income and background. At a time of increasing
diversity, it is institutions that offer us the best way to ensure a
more integrated society.
Firstly, it is important we define some terms. Integration is
too often seen as a question about those on the margins – a
question of how we reach out to the least engaged, the smallest
minority, the recent migrant. In fact, in a richly diverse country,
integration is now a question for the mainstream, about the
mainstream. It is a question about the set of contacts and
friendships that all citizens have and the gaps that exist in these
networks between rich and poor, black and white, old and
young. It is a question for each city, each village, each street,
each family.
In policy terms, it is now no longer a question relevant only
to the Home Office or Department of Communities and Local
Government (DCLG). It is a question for the Department for
Education (DfE) – who presently oversees an education system
where half of all children on free school meals are educated
together in just 20 per cent of the schools – hardly a recipe 
for building the networks that will help these young people 
find work.
It is a question for the Treasury and Department for Work
and Pensions (DWP) whose work to increase employment is
significantly challenged by a dis-integrated society where most
unemployed people have friends who are mostly out of work. It
is also a question for the Department of Health; efforts to
address elderly well-being are mostly about reducing isolation.
But when half of our elderly say that their main companion is the
television this is not a failure of the health service, it is a failure of
integration – it is a failure of intergenerational friendships.
What then are institutions and what role do they play?
Most simply, institutions are places where people from different
sections of society come together regularly and build trust. For
many of us we may think of the kind of community meeting
points which became so prominent in the Victorian era: not only
schools and churches, but also trade unions, working men’s
clubs, the Women’s Institute, the Scouts and Guides. At their
peak these groups brought together large segments of the
population on a regular basis. Trade unions mixed citizens by
age and income up and down the country. Local churches
brought whole communities of all ages and incomes together.
But even if institutions can physically bring people
together, how do they build a more integrated society? A more
integrated society is one where we trust each other more, no
matter what our background. Research has shown us that one of
the main drivers of trust of those from different age-groups,
ethnicities or income brackets is whether you have had a positive
experience meeting someone from this group. A positive
experience with someone from another group makes you more
trusting not only of the one individual you have met but in fact
the group they are from as a whole.
Whether it’s our capacity for empathy, or our tendency
towards generalisations, positive experiences with one member
of a group increase our opinion of that group in general – even if
we define that group as broadly as just ‘foreigners’ or ‘old
people’. Research has even shown that having positive contact
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with people from a different background not only increases your
trust of that specific group, it actually increases your trust of
other groups generally; in other words if a Pole meets a
Hungarian and has a positive experience, they are more likely to
trust a German.
This is where institutions are critical. When they work,
institutions create spaces where contact takes place. The bad
news is that not all contact is positive. To build a more integrated
society we need to build institutions that don’t just bring people
together but do so in ‘the right way’. So what is ‘the right way’?
Let me suggest three key criteria. Firstly, individuals must
feel on an equal footing – where they feel neither superior nor
inferior to others they meet. This approach can be contrasted
with ‘the wrong kind’ of contact that we might find in prisons –
where guards and prisoners may be experiencing contact across
diverse groups but it is far from on an equal footing. Secondly,
individuals should feel they are part of a common project –
excellent community or youth work often starts and succeeds 
on this principle. Contrast this with poorly run residential 
homes – where residents feel they are the project rather than
being part of it.
Thirdly, institutions must be seen as accessible to multiple
groups. A lack of integration often occurs because institutions
are seen as exclusive. Whether schools, churches, or sports clubs,
an institution fails as a vehicle for integration if it is seen as ‘not
really for the likes of you’. This reveals a guiding principle of
sorts: an ideal institution must be marketable and attractive to
multiple segments of a population.
What is promising is that we know that it is possible to
develop new institutions that meet these three criteria: equality,
common purpose and diversity. The charity I co-founded – The
Challenge – was set up for this very purpose.
Our first institution – the National Citizen Service – has
mixed over 50,000 young people of all incomes and ethnicities
over the last three years. 17 per cent of our participants are on
free school meals, 8 per cent from private schools; 65 per cent are
from an ethnic minority, 35 per cent are white; all participants are
15-17 years old and most take on projects with people who are
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much younger or much older. It has achieved this mix by
ensuring all groups can afford to take part, all groups are
considered when the marketing plan is devised and all activities
are designed with a mix of participants in mind. The result?
Participants’ levels of trust of others rise by the end of the two-
month programme and remain higher one year on.
Achieving this same inclusivity in existing institutions is
critical. This may require creativity: flexible opening hours,
better disabled and elderly access, bursaries or scholarships 
and in a small number of cases quotas or financial incentives.
Above us – it requires a good marketing plan based on a 
proper understanding of why different groups will want to join
the institution.
Another challenge will come in making sure our
institutions are scalable – both in demand and supply. On the
supply side, we must design new institutions with scale in mind –
are we building a brand that will last, are we building a long-
term funding model, are we designing something that will work
in different parts of the country? This means accepting that we
need to be prepared to think top-down about community
development as well as from the grassroots. On the demand side,
we need to ensure that we design institutions that people
genuinely want to join. We cannot assume that ‘if we build it,
they will come’.
One great example of building around people’s desires is
the GoodGym – a local sports club that offers young
professionals a chance to ensure they do exercise by arranging a
running route that ends at the house of an elderly citizen who is
expecting their visit. Organised centrally and designed around a
genuine consumer need – this is integration designed for scale.
Another example of building for long-term sustainability is
Headstart – a social action programme that incentivises young
people to volunteer by guaranteeing them an interview for a
part-time job. Corporates find that young people who complete
the volunteering are more job-ready that their standard
candidate – which reduces their cost of recruitment and in turn
helps fund the institution’s growth.
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The debate on the need for more integration is broadly
over. The key debate today is not if but how. How do we build a
more integrated society? – by age, income and ethnicity. This is
the same debate our ancestors – the Victorians – faced. As their
country was transformed by a surging birth-rate, growing
inequality and fast urbanisation they faced a society in danger of
social fracture. Their response was to build a series of institutions
where people of all ages, backgrounds and incomes came
together, were treated with a degree of equality and took part in
a common purpose. It is time for us to do the same.
Jon Yates is co-founder and Strategy Director of The Challenge.
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Schools in England are ethnically segregated, shown by an
ongoing research programme at Centre for Market and Public
Organisation (CMPO) at the University of Bristol.1 We have
shown that the degree of segregation varies by ethnicity and 
by location, and we have illustrated that schools do not dilute
the residential segregation of the neighbourhood, but rather
tend to strengthen it. (The latest patterns in school segregation
are discussed by Rich Harris of CMPO in another piece in 
this collection.)
It seems likely that the ethnic composition of a school will
affect its pupils’ views, though a robust causal study to show this
would be hard to implement. If one pupil only ever meets pupils
of her own ethnicity then it is very difficult to form an open-
minded attitude to other groups, and very easy to believe stories
about them which may or may not be true.
This is wonderfully illustrated by the following quote from
a school twinning programme. A primary school head teacher in
Huddersfield ran a school in which 92 per cent of pupils were of
Pakistani heritage. She said: ‘Some of our children live their lives
without meeting someone from another culture until they go to
high school or even the workplace. They can grow up with such
a lot of misconceptions and prejudices.’ Illustrating the myths
that can arise and survive in an environment where you simply
never meet people from other groups, she added: ‘Our pupils
think it’s amazing that they [white kids] like pizza too.’2 Every-
one eats pizza, every child eats pizza; for a group of pupils to
believe that pupils of a different ethnicity do not eat pizza is
essentially to say they have nothing in common at all.
What can be done?3 The first step to an answer is to see
that segregation is a process; it’s not just a characteristic at a
point in time, it has a history. And to attempt to influence school
segregation, it helps to understand that process. One of the most
widely used approaches is the model of Nobel Prize winner
Thomas Schelling.4 This dealt with residential segregation but
the same principles apply to school sorting.
Briefly, the model traces out the implications of a rule
whereby everyone moves to another location (neighbourhood,
school) if they are unhappy with the racial composition of 
their current location. The contribution of the research is to
show that even fairly liberal neighbourhood preferences can
rapidly lead to a completely segregated outcome. The basic
approach is very simple and lends itself very nicely to simula-
tion: there are many public websites where you can set up a
model society with specific preferences and watch neighbour-
hood segregation arise.5
One of the key results is a disconnect between individual
preferences and social outcomes: just a small degree of
preference for living among one’s own ‘type’ can generate a
completely segregated outcome; an outcome more segregated
than any one person would individually want. In the jargon of
economics, there are externalities in this process: my action in
moving school changes the composition of schools and thereby
affects the decisions of others in those schools. This is why the
social outcome may not reflect individual preferences.
Given ten years of pupil data in England, we can watch the
process of ethnic change in school intakes happen (this is on-
going work at CMPO). London is particularly interesting with
new groups continually refreshing the population. But in some
places the process of segregation has largely been completed.
Oldham has one of the highest levels of school segregation in
England; in our original work, it had the highest of all. It was
also a site of riots in 2001 between ethnic groups.6
The town is beginning a bold project to break out of this
segregation by offering a brand new ethnically-mixed school to
parents. This may be the only way to change things: once in a
segregated equilibrium, no one individual can change the
situation through her own action, and some form of collective
response is needed.
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Waterhead Academy is a secondary school sponsored by
Oldham College, and has an ethnically mixed intake (45 per cent
of the pupils are of Pakistani heritage, and nearly 40 per cent are
White British).7 The hope is that there are parents who would
prefer a mixed school if one were offered, and that the school
will thrive and have an impact on other schools in the town. It
began on split sites in 2010 and moved into a single new site in
2012. Alun Francis, the Principal of Oldham College, told me
that the plan was to focus on the pupils, the things they had in
common, providing a good school experience and trying to allay
the anxieties of the parents. While the Ofsted visit in March 2013
noted that exam performance required improvement, it
highlighted good behaviour from the pupils, and respect and
openness around faith issues. While these are obviously early
days, Francis told me he was cautiously optimistic.
Of course, being in the same school building is just a start.
Friendship groups are obviously important, and the
development of a place where pupils from different ethnic
groups can simply hang out together in a relaxed way when the
supervising presence of teachers is absent. But it is a start and
possibly the only way that a segregated equilibrium can be
escaped: the eyes of many other communities will undoubtedly
be on Waterhead Academy.
At least the pupils are now eating pizza together.
Simon Burgess is Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for
Market and Public Organisation at the University of Bristol.
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1 The first paper was Ethnic Segregation in England’s Schools, Burgess
and Wilson, 2003, CMPO Working Paper no 86,
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp86.pdf.
Since then, the programme has produced a substantial number
of research papers and conferences.
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should anything be done?
4 Schelling, Thomas C, 1971, ‘Dynamic Models of Segregation’,
vol. 1, pp. 143 – 186
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schelling.html or ‘The Schelling Segregation Model’, available 
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Most of the attention concerning immigrant integration is
devoted to problems at the bottom of society. This is
understandable given that Britain’s post-war immigrants have
had, for the most part, poorer educational and employment
profiles than natives. But it means that problems of equality and
opportunity at the top of the tree sometimes get overlooked.
This essay looks at the problems associated with ethnic
penalties in the professions, and other high reward/status
sectors, and the extent to which these are due to persistent
discrimination or to other factors. (And we should bear in mind
that one problem here is lack of reliable data.) I will also look at
things from the perspective of one runaway successful group,
Indians, to assess what has gone well for them and what still
holds back further gains.
Ethnic penalties
A decade ago, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit produced a
groundbreaking report, ‘Ethnic Minorities and the Labour
Market’, which pointed to an ethnic penalty suffered by Black,
Pakistani and Bangladeshi men in particular, in some instances
leaving them with unemployment risks twice or thrice their white
peers—alongside unexplained earnings shortfalls of between
£100–150 per week. Although this was not direct evidence of
discrimination, it was, Tony Blair suggested, a heavy hint.
But among Indian men a different picture emerged.
Although this group boasted parity of earnings (and similar odds
of being out of work) with their white counterparts, it over-
looked the fact that they were, on average, rather better educated,
skilled and experienced. The analysis showed that they should
have been doing between 5-15 per cent better on earnings alone.
This unexpected finding was not lost on the PM. It was
clear that some minorities were getting less than their due. The
report pointed to waiters in Indian restaurants holding PhDs and
so on. There was potential here for people from successful
minorities to grow frustrated and disillusioned.
At about the same time, Colin Powell, the visiting black US
Secretary of State, was described as exactly the kind of success at
the top that Britain conspicuously lacked. And a former
Canadian High Commissioner to London boasted that, after the
passage of one generation, the returns to all migrants in Canada’s
labour market were free of ethnic penalties.
Sir David Bell, a former boss of Ofsted, once spoke
enthusiastically about the fact that girls overall outpaced boys in
the compulsory schooling system. But he then paused to share
his fear that their gender premium was the minimum that would
be needed to offset the effects of sex discrimination in
employment. Their success, in other words, was a ‘bittersweet’
one and parallels the pressures facing successful minorities.
On the other side of the ledger there is now solid evidence
of several large minorities matching or doing better, on average,
in educational and employment outcomes than the white
majority. This is the big empirical finding that few experts
foresaw a generation ago. One reason for the failure to spot this
trend is that, partly for political reasons, the analysts of race
always lumped together post-war immigrants and their children
under the ‘ethnic minority’ banner believing they shared more in
common with other minorities than they ever would with the
majority white community. That is now a dated picture.
Adjusting for generation and educational starting points, it
is only in the past 15–20 years that some minorities have had the
opportunity to challenge for the very top jobs on any scale. So
how well are they doing, and what are the ‘glass ceiling’
problems that are emerging?
Ingredients of success at the top
In the case of migrants and minorities, the main drivers of
success continue to be very similar to those of natives. Schooling,
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support networks and career management skills are all vital to
access high reward and high status sectors. But, beneath this
layer sits another set of factors that disproportionately shape
choice and opportunity—geography, gender and generation, the
three Gs.
In the case of geography some minorities originally 
settled in parts of the country that have weathered regional
economic adjustments better than others. The Pakistani
community is concentrated in northern, industrial England, 
and has been disproportionately exposed to poor labour 
demand as a result. Indians, by contrast, have benefited from a
London/south-east effect that has not only cushioned long-term
change but also placed them in close proximity to the capital’s
outperforming sectors.
But while place matters, even somewhere like London
contains significant variations. Access to transport is a
circumstantial factor affecting London ethnic groups, white and
non-white, so the exact path of tube line extensions and cross-
city new routes is a pivotal, yet hidden, aspect of who is best
placed to get ahead.
But geographic effects are also felt in other ways, including
the relative segregation of groups in different parts of the
country. Other parts of this volume are devoted to this question
but it is worth stressing that, regardless of the ethnic plurality of
the neighbourhoods favoured by minorities, the bigger test lies
in first, their willingness and ability to access the widest set of job
opportunities, and second, their capabilities in navigating careers
once they have achieved initial opportunities. There is scant
evidence to suggest that residential segregation as such alters this
equation greatly.
However, the opposite phenomenon needs greater
investigation, namely when minorities are as mobile as others in
moving to take up new opportunities in, say, the job magnets
represented by the M4, M40, M3, M5, M23 and M11 motorway
corridors. Their mobility certainly adds to their strength and
resilience in the labour market. What is not known are how
economic opportunities then lead, indirectly, to a greater
likelihood of new personal identities and emotional outlooks.
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Eric Kaufmann’s timely essay in this volume notes that
these minorities are only too aware of this, choosing, where they
can, to enter new areas that are less ethnically diverse than where
they came from but equally not snow-white cul-de-sacs.
On gender, it goes without saying that higher levels of
female economic activity are a major factor in helping minorities
avoid poverty and access better opportunities. It is one feature of
the Pakistani community that has changed only modestly and it
hampers its ability to get ahead economically. Once more,
Indians report exceptionally high rates of female employment
driving significantly better outcomes.
And the advancement of minorities is often very sector-
specific. Like America, the biggest headway in Britain has been
made in the public sector. Almost a decade ago, Michael Portillo,
the former Tory minister, acknowledged that his party had been
too harsh in attacking some of the public sector’s equal
opportunities processes. Equally, the last ten years have seen
academia start to deliver a substantial breakthrough for certain
minorities, first as undergraduate and postgraduate students and
latterly as junior and senior faculty.
The legal and medical professions have remained
important bellwethers in gauging progress. The solicitors’
progression is striking: out of 130,000 practice certificate
holders, 12.6 per cent were from black and minority ethnic
backgrounds in 2012, with South Asians making up more than
half this figure. The pipeline is even more striking: BMEs made
up almost 40 per cent of student trainees in 2012.
Glass ceilings and reputational concerns
In looking at how well or poorly groups are doing ‘at the top’, it
is important to consider the gatekeeper, tipping point and
critical mass effects of higher education and changes among the
traditional professions. But it is tempting to overdo this and
crowd out the more structural factors that have played a big part
in why certain groups have outshone.
The balance between the structural and the cultural is a
delicate one. ‘Model minorities’ have come in for special
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attention by some observers who stress the centrality of
individual and group aspirational values and pro-educational
dispositions. Accordingly, East African Asians tend to be
admired for their cultural attributes while the more objective
assets that they brought with them including English as the
lingua franca, previous urbanisation and white-collar
employment, tend to be downplayed.
Regardless of how they have found their way to the top
professions, how are they doing once there? Medicine and the
law offer somewhat contrasting pictures. Medicine’s professional
self-governing structures have sometimes struggled to keep pace
with the demand for training places among aspirational
minorities increasingly geared towards highly prized medical
sub-disciplines such as cardiology and neurology. The image of
medicine also suffers from the notorious case of one London
medical school, St George’s that operated a quota to limit
minorities’ access to places. That case is indirectly linked to
current controversies over the disproportionate over-representa-
tion of minority doctors among the GMC’s misconduct and
disciplinary affairs committees.
In the law a turbulent past has now given way to a
generally more positive professional culture in which gender
diversity has helped clear the way for minorities. As we have
seen, there are very high current levels of minority recruitment
into the profession and an arms-length sector watchdog, the
Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), which has enshrined
diversity outcomes within its new regulatory framework.1 Set
against this, there remains patchy success outcomes in terms of
minority recruitment to top City law firms and partner status.
But the biggest cloud cannot be ignored: a five-year,
ongoing dispute centred on claims that the sector’s own
regulator not only disproportionately picks up allegations of
poor practice and misconduct among minority lawyers but that it
has internalised negative stereotypes in the judgements of its
investigatory staff.
A large number of ethnic minority lawyers still work in
small and thus less profitable high street practices. Their
exposure to the fragile end of the sector means that the regulator
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disproportionately scrutinises them when it comes to poor
service standards and/or issues of conduct. That same regulator
now requires all solicitor firms to produce annual submissions on
their diversity profile, creating a fresh driver of change through
transparency. We can expect close interrogation of these data in
the future alongside ongoing scrutiny of judicial appointments
where progress has been slow.
‘People like us’
While the evidence is far from definitive about who is at or on
their way to the top, it is clear that considerable change is under
way. The question relates to my opening point, namely, should
these successful minorities be doing even better than they are?
And what is the role of culture in shaping choice, orientation 
and decisions?
There has been a steady colonisation of fee-paying
education by Indians. In some parts of the community there is
an awareness of the importance of soft skills, employment
awareness, internships, volunteering, flexibility and overall active
career management. These traits are virtually hardwired into the
bulk of middle class Indians and many others like them. And
factors such as geography, transport, female attainment, and so
on serve to reinforce advantage.
It may be that Indians first, and others in due course, are
absorbing the lessons of how to get on in the changing economy.
Once breakthroughs in highly prized sectors and strata are
achieved, tipping points can follow. Others coming up the ranks
see ‘people like us’. Appointing and favouring those like us may
be a useful way of breaking glass ceilings.
Mapping integration at the top
In conclusion: we need to pay attention not just to what happens
to immigrants and minorities, group by group, but also from one
sector to another and on the way up. Thus, in parts of the high
reward, high status private sector, there have been sizeable
pockets of success at the top that roughly compares with the
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impressive scale of change in senior management ranks in the
public sector. And we also now have insights about how these
outcomes have been secured, as well as a relevant few tips from
when things have gone awry.
There are many factors contributing to professional, white-
collar success but certain ‘insider’ advantages still tend to reside
disproportionately with middle class whites. Those who have
interned with national think-tanks, newspapers and PR firms are
advantaged as compared with those who have not.
In the long run the top matters as much as the bottom or
middle, not least because of what it says about the openness of
these ranks to immigrant offspring. Britain is a country that,
somewhat absent-mindedly, subscribes to a liberal core value,
namely that the tools of achievement and progression should be
equally available to everyone. Any evidence that ethnic or
migrant background reduces opportunity is, and must remain, a
serious matter and priority to be tackled. In past decades many
immigrants put up with poor treatment in the sincere belief that
unfairness would not stand in the way of their children. That is
the implicit bargain struck with first generation migrants and it
has yet to be honoured in full, for all.
Shamit Saggar is Director of the Understanding Society Policy Unit and
Professor of Public Policy, based in the Institute for Social and
Economic Research at the University of Essex.
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The traditional model of teaching where the teacher stands at the
front of the classroom and imparts knowledge, with desks in
rows, pupils facing forward, has been under attack since the days
of Rousseau and increasingly in the last 50 years. Teachers and
laymen alike often believe that we are still educating our children
in this system. But we are not. Progressive teaching methods
have become the norm.
In most classrooms, the teacher is a ‘facilitator of learning,’
moving among grouped desks, helping children to stay on task
with a set project while they ‘discover’ their learning. Rarely does
the teacher stand at the front and teach. The idea behind this is
that having children co-manage their own learning should
inspire children to be more creative, drawing out, à la Rousseau,
something from inside the child.
Progressive teaching methods sound seductive. But when
one observes their reality in the classroom, it is hard to defend
them. Put simply, it is hard for a child to be creative when he has
little in his head to be creative with. Traditionalists or knowledge
advocates believe it is by giving the child knowledge and
allowing him to manipulate that knowledge that he will become
creative and learn how to think.
The subjects that have been most influenced by
progressive, or child-centred teaching methods as it is often
referred to, are English, history and geography. Progressive
teaching methods ensure History is too often taught as
unconnected stand-alone events or people in order to teach
pupils certain skills, like being able to infer or justify one’s point
of view. Lessons tend to have a moral tale at the end. Children
are asked how they would feel if they had to live through various
times in history, and the content of what is being taught is of less
importance. This is meant to teach children empathy. But it is
hard to empathise with something one knows little about.
Knowledge, surely, must come first.
But Britain seems to have embraced this idea of teaching
skills over knowledge more than any other country, apart from
the USA. Interestingly, both the UK and the USA perform
poorly in global comparisons, according to international PISA
tests in reading, maths and science. The UK is in 26th place in
the world, while the USA is 36th. The one exception to the
general demise of teaching in the USA is the state of Massa-
chusetts, where they teach a knowledge curriculum inspired by
E.D. Hirsch – a prominent critic of progressive education.
It is often argued that funding levels for education or the
quality of the intake of children are central to educational
outcomes. They are obviously relevant factors. But is it only
about funding and intake? By Pisa’s world standards, Estonia is
in 11th place, Poland 14th and Slovenia 21st, all with a greater
number of far poorer children, all with education budgets that
are tiny in comparison to the near-£90 billion the UK spends per
year on its education system. So perhaps it is something else.
One common characteristic among countries that do well by
international standards is that they tend to teach traditionally.
Knowledge is at their core.
Why does Britain insist on using teaching methods that just
don’t work? And why would teachers, who have seen how these
methods fail in their classrooms, be so reluctant to let them go?
There is clearly a whole jumble of reasons to consider but
many of them stem from the particular form of Britain’s liberal
pedagogical revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. This revolution
challenged what was then seen as a hierarchical and
authoritarian form of teaching and thinking in the name of
equality and creativity. The liberal reformers stressed not only
that all human lives are of equal value, regardless of race, gender
and class, but all of us have creativity and ability within us that
just needs to be released by the teacher.
These ideas overlapped with the anti-racism struggle that
was emerging at the same time. Indeed, I believe that one reason
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progressive teaching methods established such deep roots in
Britain is because of this entanglement with race. Ethnic
minority children were seen as particularly disadvantaged by
traditional methods that came to be seen as oppressive,
imperialist and racist.
Fast forward to 2002. In that year Diane Abbott did
something extraordinary. She established a yearly conference
called London Schools and the Black Child, under Ken
Livingstone, the then Mayor of London. Then, in 2011 under
Boris Johnson’s leadership, a different sort of Black Child
conference was put on by city hall, without the support of Diane
Abbott. It attracted less than one fifth of the black families that
had previously attended Abbott’s conferences. While the
speakers spoke eloquently about the same issues, they spoke
with a different emphasis. Among others, Tony Sewell (CEO of
Generating Genius, a charity that helps bright black boys get
into Russell Group universities), Lindsay Johns (who works with
black youngsters in a Peckham mentoring programme) and
Michael Gove (current Education Secretary) all spoke from the
right, or at least not from the left. As such, some black families
felt the conference could not really be for them.
Not only did much of the black community boycott the
2011 conference organised by Boris Johnson, but some blacks
were so outraged by current education policy that they stood
outside the conference protesting. Led by Lee Jasper (Ken
Livingstone’s race and policing adviser), the protestors held
placards saying, ‘We don’t want Latin. We want opportunity.’
Many people might have assumed that learning Latin
simply is opportunity. When one learns English, maths, science
at school, future doors open. It should be obvious. But speak to
many leaders of the black community in Britain and indeed to
most teachers and they will all agree that Michael Gove is a bad
man. He’s bad, it would seem, because he wants British children,
whatever their colour, to learn traditional knowledge at school.
He wants all children, not just rich white children to access an
old-fashioned education that will make them culturally literate.
Gove wants them educated enough to one day choose their
careers rather than lose out on a job opportunity to a young
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recent immigrant whose English is a second language but who
speaks it better than they do. But still they protest.
Is it simply because Michael Gove is a Tory? In part I think
it is. Most black Britons continue to regard Tories as inherently
unsympathetic to them (despite the fact that many black people
hold deeply socially conservative views). But in part it is because
they reject what they see as an education system that has
historically marginalised their children. While Gove’s position on
knowledge is inspirational and right, neither Gove nor any of the
knowledge advocates recognise sufficiently the historical legacy
of our education system and the misrepresentation of ethnic
people in our old history books. ‘Latin’ is a symbol of that out-
of-date, unrepresentative, racist regime. As is the recent, failed,
attempt not to include Mary Seacole—the ‘black Florence
Nightingale’—in the history curriculum.
The liberal reformers were right about one thing. By the
1970s and 1980s there was a growing sense that the old narratives
no longer reflected the diversity of modern Britain, if indeed they
ever had. Our Island Story is an example of a book used in schools
some 50 years ago. While it gives a coherent and chronological
analysis of history, it also paints Britain as the saviour of the
colonised world. Africans and Asians are considered happy to
have been civilised by Britain and never is there any recognition
of their desire for self-determination. Clearly, this way of
teaching history had to change.
But part of the tragedy of modern British education is that
the justified rejection of this historical narrative also led to the
rejection of traditional teaching, teaching which is of most value
to those who have the least support at home. Traditional
teaching gives knowledge to children in school who cannot
otherwise access it. The very people teachers are most trying to
help—the poor, the ethnic minorities—are the ones who have
suffered the most from the reign of progressive teaching.
Not all of these children have the luxury of sitting at home
around the dinner table, listening to their educated parents’
discussions and learning historical, geographical, and scientific
knowledge as they go. While most state-educated children are
drawing pictures on sugar paper in groups to explore their
Race and the tragedy of British education
feelings around a historical event, children whose parents can
afford £33,000 per year in fees are soaking up tons of knowledge
at Eton in their history lessons as well as benefiting from their
parents’ influence. And the divide between the haves and the
have-nots widens further.
Of course it doesn’t help that David Cameron hails Our
Island Story as his favourite book as a child without qualification.
Had Cameron realised that such a statement might offend ethnic
minorities, I’m sure he would not have said it. Add to this the
campaign of right-leaning think tanks like Civitas to have Our
Island Story reintroduced into schools and one can see why most
ethnic minority leaders do not trust the Conservatives and
believe the curriculum alienates their children.
So blacks campaign for more ‘black history’ to be taught
and this strengthens the hold of the progressive mindset that has
our teachers in shackles. The more teaching becomes progressive,
the less black children and indeed all children learn in history
lessons altogether. Convinced that their children don’t know any
black history because teaching isn’t progressive enough, the
blacks continue to campaign. And the vicious circle continues.
Progressive methods do not teach ‘black history’ properly.
Dropping ethnic people, like Mary Seacole, into our history
syllabus is tokenistic: it neither teaches history nor black people’s
genuine contribution to it, because before you can do that you
need to be teaching history properly. And before you do that, we
need to recover knowledge in the whole curriculum. And before
we can do that, we need to address the ideology that says
knowledge is oppressive because British history so often tells ‘his
story’ and he’s white.
What does black history mean anyway? Does the history of
apartheid in South Africa have anything to do with the ancient
kingdoms of Africa, or the speeches of Martin Luther King or
the French general Thomas-Alexandre Dumas? Not really.
Teaching black history in a progressive/skills curriculum is a far
cry from teaching history in a knowledge curriculum that ensures
that ethnic people are represented appropriately and accurately.
The answer is not to give a tick list of Rosa Parks, Mary Seacole,
Martin Luther King and Equiano to teachers. That exacerbates
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the problem. It makes teachers and educationalists feel that the
only way of teaching history in a way that accommodates all the
different backgrounds in the classroom is to jump around,
ignoring chronology and context, giving children bits of
information here and there, making sure that some of those 
bits are ethnic.
Some people cannot imagine teaching a chronological,
coherent and connected history of Britain that includes ethnic
people. But it is possible to teach a knowledge-rich and
traditional history curriculum without making ethnic people
seem like passive dupes. In fact, the only way to teach black
history properly is to ensure history as a whole is taught in a
coherent and chronological manner with the teacher standing at
the front of the class.
Teaching children knowledge, whatever their colour, will
mean they will be better placed to read a broadsheet newspaper
and to understand the world around them. Is knowing the
history of your country racist? Are chemical bonds, magnetic
forces, algebra, and the rules of French grammar racist? Is
learning Latin racist? Some progressives complain in the liberal
press about the idea of our children being taught Shakespeare,
or grammar, or anything that sounds too old-fashioned. But they
don’t seem to understand that because of the lack of knowledge
being taught in our schools, huge numbers of our school leavers
are unable to read those very newspapers. Just under 20 per cent
of our school leavers are functionally illiterate and just over 20
per cent are functionally innumerate. Worse still, some of those
in the 80 per cent who are capable of decoding the words in
newspapers lack the cultural and historical knowledge to
understand the topics being discussed.
The purpose of teaching history according to one recent
article, written by a teacher in the Guardian, should be ‘to
empower minority groups and dispel prejudice, challenging
negative stereotypes’. What this teacher fails to realise is that this
cannot be achieved, as is so often attempted, in a vacuum of
contextual knowledge about the past. But if deep down, teachers
are convinced that teaching knowledge is racist, they simply
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won’t teach it no matter how aware they are of the folly of skills-
based lessons.
Somehow we have to figure out how to make those who are
against Gove’s reforms of the curriculum feel secure with
tradition. Knowledge isn’t oppressive or racist. It is liberating.
Tradition is what has given us our most successful
revolutionaries. Stokely Carmichael who led the Black Panthers
and was a major figure in the civil rights movement in America
dropped gang life so inspired was he at his science specialist
school and so busy was he reading Darwin and Marx. Mandela
went to an elite Methodist mission school. In his Dream speech,
Martin Luther King alluded to the Declaration of Independence,
the Gettysburg Address, the Old Testament, the New Testament,
and Shakespeare’s Richard III. Revolutions are created with
traditional thinking. All of those who stand against Gove do so
thinking they are fighting oppression when in fact their stance is
what anchors it.
Race plays a complex, under-considered role in preventing
the change we need in our schools. The sooner we recognise 
that, the sooner we can begin teaching our children properly –
and the sooner we’ll end the educational inequality that blights
this country.
Katharine Birbalsingh is Headmistress Designate of the Michaela free
school, opening in 2014 in Wembley Park, London. She is the author of
To Miss with Love (Penguin).
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9 A decade of solidarity?
Polish integration in the
UK post-enlargement
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I am a British citizen writing about Polish integration in the
UK.1 Though I do not speak Polish and have no network of close
Polish friends, my partner Dagmara is Polish. Through her, I 
am continually reminded, via the ebb and flow of commonalities
and differences, that the world remains both large and small and
that being a ‘migrant’ involves continual negotiation between
multiple homes. The professional coat that my partner wears to
work, for example, means that she is a more knowledgeable
architect in English (the language of her advanced training) than
in Polish: and would need to retrain were she ever to want to
practice architecture in Poland.
Her social coat is truly technicolor: Dagmara has more
international but less British friends than I and is in regular
contact via Skype with family back in Poland. Then there is her
cultural coat: this is insulated with threads from home – the
occasional Polish meal, the frustration with the Polish football
team, a residual interest in Polish current affairs – but a lot of
warmth now comes from international and British cultural
reference points. In short, she is integrated in the UK but retains
a hybrid, transnational social identity and has become part of an
international social and professional milieu.
The Polish are now the most common foreign nationality in
the UK and the Polish-born population is now 579,000 (up from
58,000 over the 2001–2011 census period).2 The half-million plus
Polish community is very heterogeneous but my single example
shows how integration can and does occur without the complete
loss of cultural references to one’s homeland. Dagmara’s form of
integration – some host country bridging capital and some
international migrant bonding capital but relatively little co-
ethnic bonding (to use Robert Putnam’s now famous termin-
ology) – is not the conventional pattern of migrant settlement.
However, it seems to be becoming an emerging integration
paradigm for migrants enmeshed within middle-class
professional spheres, and especially those in mixed-nationality
relationships and/or international workplaces. My experience is
also not unusual: mixed-nationality relationships mean that there
are now up to 3 million people in the UK of mixed ethnicity
constituting the largest and fastest growing ethnic group.3
Does the same type of integration happen in the low-wage
workplace and amongst those living within mono-national
households? Well, partly it does. The English-speaking Poles
have joined the British low-wage service economy en masse and
work alongside native citizens. Though they may or may not get
on socially, there is no narrow ethnic enclave economy where
migrants remain hidden and isolated from British-born workers.
This said, language is undoubtedly key and outside of the
front of shop service work, there are jobs where Polish might be
the only language spoken. My fieldwork, for instance, has taken
me to farms and food processing plants where workers are
organised into language groups: with only the leader of these
teams able to speak fluent English. The point here is that workers
least able to integrate will also be those most likely to be hidden
from public view because of the way in which language
determines their employment opportunities (see also White, 2011:
138). Moreover, many jobs for Polish migrants, especially those
with limited language skills, remain temporary and this lack of
security in employment (and thus also housing) is all too often
associated with a ‘toe in the water’ approach to life in the UK.
Where there is concern about Polish integration, then, it is
specific to workers limited to low-wage jobs unable to speak
enough English to progress socially or professionally and often
employed on insecure contracts living in marginalised private
rented housing (Markova and Black, 2007: 66). Even here,
though, there is room for some optimism. Historical precedents,
for example, suggest that the current influx from Poland will not
cause politicians to re-visit the question of ‘parallel lives’ and
‘failed multiculturalism’.4
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There have been, albeit modest, Polish influxes before (for
example see the early work of Dr Kathy Burrell at the University
of Liverpool) and there have also been much larger low-wage
Catholic migrant influxes (from Ireland). In the case of both the
historic Polish and Irish communities integration has simply not
been a major problem into the second and third generations.
Correspondingly, we have not seen the persistence of spatial
segregation amongst the historic Polish and Irish communities
and, in many cases, surnames and the occasional family ancestral
holiday remain the only lingering traces of a migrant past.
Whether or not the current mass of low-wage Polish
workers remain rooted to the bottom of the UK labour market,
whether they stay in the UK over the long-term, and the extent to
which their children follow their employment lead remain,
however, open questions. Certainly the employers I spoke to
during the course of field research felt that the low-wage Poles
were doing more than enough professionally to prove themselves
worthy workers (Scott, 2013a, 2013b).
The question is whether this effort will pay off: will it lead
to social mobility either for them or deferred for their children?
In this sense, questions of integration are bound up in questions
of intergenerational social mobility (and immobility). It is also
worth noting here, in respect to the prospects for upward
mobility, that the Polish community in the UK is in a particularly
strong position: being both youthful and well-educated (Fihel
and Kaczmarczyk, 2009: 34–36).
An additional integration factor is the nature and
configuration of migrant families (for example see the work of
Professor Louise Ryan at Middlesex University). There are
certainly many Poles in the UK temporarily who have clear
family commitments back home that they plan to return to,
eventually. Ryan et al (2009), for example, note how the Poles
they spoke to in London were on the whole ‘uncertain about how
long they would remain in Britain and when or even if they
would return to Poland’. This sense of being ‘in limbo’ is
common to most first generation migrants and is fundamentally
bound up with the split location of one’s closest friends and
family. Simply put, it is difficult to commit to a host country,
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irrespective of whether one is a professional middle-class or a
low-wage migrant, when one remains tied to family back in the
home country.
Integration is also fundamentally influenced by one’s
residential geography. In the UK few migrants live in mono-
national or mono-ethnic ghettoes but many Poles do now live in
what have been termed ‘global neighbourhoods’ (Logan and
Zhang, 2010). The emergence of such neighbourhoods is
important because they do offer more of an opportunity for
mixing than the ghetto. The question is whether this mixing
occurs, and, whether there are route ways up and out of the more
deprived global neighbourhoods?
Integration, then, can have an important spatial component
and there is an urgent need for more attention to be directed
towards the increasingly global neighbourhoods that now house
new migrant communities. Specifically, do such neighbourhoods
offer an opportunity for all groups to learn to live together, or,
are they home to new forms of ghettoisation whereby the
majority continue to avoid such areas and/or the diverse groups
living within them remain socially and culturally separate from
each other. Anecdotally, for example, one hears of inter-ethnic
rivalry and community tensions especially when new arrivals
appear to be competing with established minorities for resources
like housing, employment, education and health.
Overall, integration is something that, ten years on from
EU enlargement, cannot yet be proclaimed to have succeeded or
failed as far as the Polish are concerned. What is clear is that
there are many Polish migrants living in the UK with a strong
return orientation – possibly though a ‘myth of return’ (Anwar,
1979) – and that this tends to be strong amongst those with
limited English-language skills, in insecure employment, living in
all Polish households.
In addition, there is a particular important group of Polish
‘commuter migrants’ (though they are officially not ‘migrants’
per se) i.e. those coming to the UK over the short-term for a
period of less than 12 but more than one month. Indeed, the UK
Government’s openness to immigration from the EU was very
much linked to the idea that it would be a ‘turnstile’ form of
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migration (Sriskandarajah et al., 2008) rather than permanent
settlement. In 2006, for instance, a staggering 221,000 Poles
came to the UK for a period of between 1 to 12 months and, even
though this figure had fallen to 84,000 by 2010, the Poles still
form one of the most important commuter migrant groups
(second only to commuter migrants from the USA) (Vargas-Silva,
2012: 6–7).
A further temporal aspect to Polish integration in the UK
revolves around the new Polish community’s relationship with
the established post-war Polish migrant community. This
relationship has certainly not been as clear-cut or positive as
might have been expected and whilst recent Polish migrants have
been attracted to areas of the country that in the past also
attracted Polish migrants, the two communities have experienced
a complex, uneven and at best partial rapprochement. As
Garapich (2007: 10) observes:
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Every researcher will hear from members of the old Polish diaspora in the
UK an identity statement similar to the one expressed by an eighty year old
lady in a letter to the Polish Daily, the newspaper catering to this diaspora:
‘We are different, we came from a country that does not exist any more’.
These kinds of statement are constantly made at meetings, in the press, and
even through the Church. They are always accompanied by a mainly
negative description of newcomers.
Thus, it seems that shared national identity may unite
migrants in some contexts but in others there are more enduring
social fissures (such as age and generation) that get in the way.
These temporal dimensions to integration underline the
dangers of generalising. It is simply not acceptable to talk of
Polish integration in the singular and this is as true socially as it
is temporally. Most notably, Polish migrants in mixed-nationality
households, those in English-speaking and largely British or
international workplaces and the children of Polish migrants all
generally experience high levels of integration.
In contrast, evidence shows that those within all-Polish
households, especially housewives and househusbands who are
not engaged in paid employment, are the least integrated (White,
2011: 165). Within the EU at least, integration is a function of
personal circumstance more than the aggregate comparative
characteristics of particular national groups (Poles versus British,
French versus British etc.). Granted, outside the EU, where the
identity frontiers are wider, and where the legal context is
different, this argument may be less applicable.
The Poles, though, can bring their families to the UK much
more easily than non-EU migrants. They have free labour market
access. They can commit over the long-term to life in the UK
without the need to acquire citizenship. They are now entitled to
welfare services should they fall upon hard times. Moreover, they
are a less visible migrant community likely to experience less
discrimination and fewer integration barriers as a result. These
facilitating factors, wrapped up within membership of the EU,
mean that the Polish experience of integration is likely to be less
structurally constrained and more personally diverse and
fragmentary than for many non-EU communities.
The big question for the future concerns second generation
Poles emerging out of the 2004 EU enlargement migration. The
second generation (if historic precedents are anything to go by)
are unlikely to remain culturally distinct, but will they remain
within the kind of low-wage agricultural and service work of their
migrant parents? Moreover, if they do experience upward social
and spatial mobility (as seems likely) then who will then take
their parents’ place at the bottom of the UK labour market? In
other words, where next for the UK’s low-wage labour markets?
Sam Scott is a Senior Lecturer in Human Geography at the University
of Gloucestershire.
Notes
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1 For an official definition of ‘integration’ see Ager and Strang
(2004). Compare this to White’s (2011: 138-9) notion of
‘sufficient integration’.
2 See: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_310441.pdf
3 See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15164970
4 The term ‘parallel lives’ come from the 2001 Cantle report (see
especially page 9).
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10 White exit and how to
stop it
Eric Kaufmann
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Is there white flight in Britain? 2011 census results, released at
the end of 2012, astounded many: in London, the white British
share of the population dropped from 58 to 45 per cent. At a
time when the capital’s economy was roaring and the city added
a million to its ranks, its population of white British people
nosedived by 620,000. More than that, white British population
losses seemed greater in more diverse areas such as Redbridge or
Newham. Across the country, places that gained minority
population seemed to lose white British and vice versa – 38 local
authorities made the top 50 for greatest minority gain and largest
white British loss, with Birmingham in first place. Is this, as some
headlines suggest, the ‘retreat’ of white Britain in the face of
immigrant diversity, an attempt by white Britons to maintain
ethnic boundaries through exit? Or is it a liberal story of
mobility towards nicer, greener pastures, with white British in
the lead because they are better off than minorities? My project,
a joint venture between Birkbeck College and Demos funded by
the Economic and Social Research Council, has tried to find out.
Let’s begin with London. Why were there 620,000 fewer
white British people there in 2011 than 2001? Our first port of
call is the census. Tragically, 2011 may be the last census, so this
could be our final glimpse into how British society is shifting at
local level. An especially useful part of the census is the ONS
Longitudinal Study, a sample of 1 per cent of the population
which is tracked from census to census.1 Despite the fact that
white British has only been an ethnic option since 2001, the ONS
LS permits us to reconstruct patterns in earlier years by assigning
ethnicity to people based on 2001 figures. This exercise shows
that the 620,000 white British loss is in fact driven not by an
excess of deaths and emigration over births and immigration, but
because of straightforward outflow to the rest of England and
Wales. Some 600,000 more white Brits left the city for the rest of
the country than entered from it. On the other hand, the
comparable figure for ethnic minorities was under 100,000.
Based on their 2001 population stock, white British left the city
at three times the rate minorities did during 2001–11. So far, so
good for the white flight hypothesis. In fact, between 1971 and
2011, London minorities lost only about a quarter as many as the
white British to the rest of the UK while gaining immensely from
international migration. No wonder, according to the ONS LS,
the city’s white British share fell from 86 per cent in 1971 to 78
per cent in 1981, 71 per cent in 1991, 58 per cent in 2001 and 45
per cent in 2011.
Is this ethnic replacement real or a spurious by-product of
more important factors? Consider the optimistic thesis: whites
are wealthier and therefore more able to leave. Actually, no.
Among white British, those with higher educational credentials
were less likely to leave (net of inflows) London than those with
high school only qualifications, while the working and middle
class were more likely to be net leavers than managers and
professionals. Among minorities, socioeconomic factors played
little part. All told, the difference in economic profile between
white British and minorities can’t explain why white Brits left the
city in larger numbers than minorities. This is not to say
economic factors are unimportant, but these appear to affect
white British and minorities equally. Again, the white flight
position seems vindicated.
Yet a closer look at net migration trends from London casts
some doubt on the white flight argument. The net white British
outflow during the 2000s was 13.4 per cent. But it was 11 per cent
in the 80s and 90s and nearly 15 per cent in the 70s when
London was much less diverse. Something on the order of half a
million more white British left London each decade than entered
it. Furthermore, the ONS LS shows that London was 86 percent
white British in 1971, with just a small share of minorities. This is
hardly sufficient to push white British out of the city at a rate of
15 per cent in the 1970s.
If growing diversity was repelling whites from London,
we’d expect an accelerating white British outflow over the
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decades, but instead, stability is the pattern. A little digging in
the historic census reveals that the last time more people moved
to London from the rest of England and Wales than left in the
other direction was the 1860s. In fact, the share of white British
leaving London is about the same today as in 1971 or 1891. For
over a century, London has lost people to the rest of the country.
Escaping the city rather than white flight seems to be the culprit.
The only reason London’s population was able to rise between
1871 and 1939 was an excess of births over deaths. As the birth
rate dropped, London’s population declined, from 8.6m on the
eve of World War II to 6.7m in 1991. Rebound in the city’s
population since 1991 has been exclusively driven by growth in
the foreign-born population, as figure 1 shows. It seems there’s
life in the counter-urbanisation theory after all.
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Figure 1 Showing the increases and decreases in the White British
population in London and surrounding local authorities
from 2001 to 2011
Source: Historic Census of England and Wales, 1841–1901; Hechter,
M, UK County Data, 1851—1966 [computer file]. Colchester, Essex:
UK Data Archive [distributor], 1976. SN: 430,http://dx.doi.org/
10.5255/UKDA-SN-430-1; ONS Census, 1971–2011
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Perhaps. But why then does ethnicity seem so important?
Our statistical analysis shows, for instance, that white British
living in mixed ethnicity households were much more likely to
stay in London than white British living in homogeneous homes.
12 per cent of British households involve a mix of ethnic groups
– including mixes of white British and white ‘other’ – be this
between partners, housemates or between generations. In
London, this share is much higher. In fact in inner London, fully
one-fifth of white British people are living in them. White British
who live in mixed-ethnic households were much less likely to
leave the city during 2001–11. We may surmise they are more
comfortable with diversity and more networked with other ethnic
groups, as well as being affected by the location preferences of
their non-white British housemates. This appears to explain their
relative satisfaction, compared to white Brits in monocultural
households, with diverse London.
From a minority vantage point, there are also indications
that cultural assimilation is associated with spatial dispersion.
For example, UK-born minorities were more likely to head
outside the M25 than their foreign-born co-ethnics. Minorities
who considered their national identity English rather than
British or ‘other’ were more likely to have left, and less likely to
have entered, London in the 2000s. In addition, the small
number of mixed-race or white-other people who assimilated
their ethnic identity between 2001 and 2011 to white British were
significantly more likely to have left the city, though this could
be affected by enumeration error between censuses. Minorities in
mixed ethnic households, another indicator of integration, are
much more likely to leave London than those in all-minority
households. Similar findings have been found in the USA, where
whites in mixed-race households are more likely to live in diverse
areas. In the most homogeneously black or white areas of major
US cities such as Detroit, as much as a third of all diversity is
contained within, rather than between, households.2
As new pockets of relative diversity have opened up outside
the M25 – Woking, Watford, Crawley, and so on – these have
begun drawing minorities from London. As a result we should
expect minority outflow from London to continue to rise. The
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outflow rate for minorities has doubled in each of the past two
decades and will likely continue to do so. But the overall
segregation picture shows no sign of change because England’s
ethnic dynamics are powered by three trends:
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1 minorities are leaving their areas of ethnic concentration - an
effect most pronounced among Afro-Caribbeans and least among
Pakistanis, but which includes all groups to some extent;
2 minorities are generally bypassing heavily white areas for new
‘superdiverse’ mixed-minority wards;
3 white British people are avoiding the rapidly growing
‘superdiverse’ wards.
Why white avoidance? Our work suggests this has less to
do with income or cultural repulsion than cultural attraction.
Our work with both a specially-commissioned YouGov poll and
longitudinal census and survey data shows that white liberals
and white conservatives leave diverse places for white areas at the
same rate. Racists and non-racists show almost no statistically
significant differences in where they move. The notion that those
who don’t like diversity leave for white areas while tolerant
whites remain has little basis in fact – stayers are most hostile to
ethnic change. Of course, it could be that white liberals are just
as averse to diversity as white conservatives but decline to admit
this on surveys. Still, it is surprising that we see no effect. So this
leaves us with a theory of cultural attraction as the best explana-
tion for what we see. Namely, that white areas have high cultural
appeal for whites whereas minority areas have less cultural
attraction for minority groups. How can this be explained?
Historically, certain cultures had greater prestige than
others in particular places. Rome conquered Greece but became
Hellenised. When they conquered Britain, however, Romans
latinised the natives in part because their culture was more
appealing. Leading American social scientist Karl Deutsch writes
that relative prestige often determines who assimilates to whom.
In Argentina, Germans did not assimilate: German culture had
higher status than Argentina’s Spanish core. In America,
however, the same Germans looked up to the Anglo core and
duly changed their names from Müller to Miller, Rittinghuysen
to Rittenhouse.
In the same way, Britain’s ethnic minorities are attracted
out of their areas of concentration towards the mainstream but
white British are not pulled into minority areas except while in
their ‘edgy’ twenties. For minorities, discomfort explains why
they avoid wards which are over 90 per cent white. Whites,
though, gravitate to these same white wards because the culture
and prestige of them exceeds that of diverse areas – even when
outward appearances are identical. Christian Lander’s satirical
book and website, Stuff White People Like, claims white liberal
North Americans are drawn to amenities like coffee, yoga,
snowboarding and vegetarian restaurants. These generally don’t
appeal to minorities, which explains why liberal enclaves such as
Vancouver’s Kitsilano are among the whitest spots in North
American cities. White attraction rather than revulsion explains
why whites cluster, and why white-minority segregation remains
so persistent across the West.
Can any policy lessons be drawn from this? American
trends suggest inner suburbs – zones of transition between cities
and leafy outer suburbs – have difficulty attracting whites. Such
areas, such as swathes of outer London, may evolve into mixed-
minority zones with little or no white presence.3 Areas with a low
white share tend to lose white British people fastest, and white
British are least likely to be comfortable living as a minority or
having their children in ‘majority minority’ schools. Yet white
British people living in diverse areas are the most tolerant segment
of white Britain. For many reasons, policy makers should try and
encourage them to stay. Positive discrimination in favour of whites
to maintain integrated neighbourhoods, as in the Starrett City
project in New York in the ‘70s and ‘80s, is illegal as well as un-
advisable. However, some sense of the risk of white depopulation
is important: housing, benefit and schooling policies in inner
suburban areas such as Croydon or Barking should avoid
measures that accelerate the departure of white British residents.
Eric Kaufmann is Professor of Politics at Birkbeck College, University of
London and a Demos Associate.
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1 The permission of the Office for National Statistics to use the
Longitudinal Study is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help
provided by staff of the Centre for Longitudinal Study
Information and User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is
supported by the ESRC Census of Population Programme
(Award Ref: ES/K000365/1). The authors alone are responsible
for the interpretation of the data.
2 Ellis, M et al, 2007, ‘The Effects of Mixed-Race Households on
Residential Segregation,’ Urban Geography, vol. 28, no 6, pp
554–77.
3 Richard Alba and Steven Romalewski, ‘The End of Segregation?
Hardly,’ Center for Urban Research, 2013. http://www.
urbanresearch.org/projects/hardly-the-end-of-segregation

11 The village in the city:
illiberal minority
behaviour
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The crimes of forced marriage, honour based violence, honour
killings and female genital mutilation continue to make the
headlines as the curtain is gradually raised on the persistence of
these practices in some of Britain’s minority communities. Even
as many ethnic minority Britons of the second and third genera-
tion are happily mixing into British society and absorbing many
of its liberal cultural norms, there are significant exceptions to
this rule – and in some cases the more traditional cultures are
growing further apart as a result of the high immigration of the
past 15 years. In these traditional cultures people are becoming
even more entrenched in their ‘home’ culture, creating not only
geographical separations but psychological separations and
making possible the kind of abuses that go on behind closed
doors often in the name of tradition, religion and culture. It is
my personal experience and that of many others that these
abuses are fundamentally about resisting or preventing cultural
integration into wider British society.
I was born here and England is the only country I can call
home. But growing up in a very traditional Indian Sikh home I
was constantly warned of the dangers of integration. I recall my
mother saying how ‘the worse insult I could bring to her front
door was that I was behaving like a white woman.’ We were
being taught to be intolerant of others and I also soon
discovered that being born in Britain did not give me and others
like me the rights enjoyed by the established population to
liberty, equality, independence, freedom, the right to education
and the right to choose a partner in marriage.
One of the most pressing issues here is the extent to which
well-meaning local authority officials and other professionals are
perpetuating the problem. There is, historically, a fear of being
labelled racist if they offer the same level of protection as they
would to a young white woman. And there is also the practice of
wheeling out the minority worker to deal with the minority
problem which builds segregation into professional practice.
Moreover, I am not aware of any other form of abuse in
which the authorities mediate with perpetrators, as is the practice
in many cases of forced marriages whereby professionals seek to
compromise with family members. And why are victims returned
to perpetrators with a specific legal injunction in place with no
or little monitoring of the victim? As a campaigner of over 20
years I still know of such experiences and hear professionals
clearly state they have been told not to get involved, to be
‘culturally sensitive’ or to accept ‘it’s what they do’.
A teacher recently told me how he had pinned up helpline
posters of my honour crime charity, Karma Nirvana, in his school
in England and how within 24 hours the head teacher tore them
down saying that she did not wish to offend communities.
But what do we actually know about the extent of the
problem? According to official government figures around 400
school children – mainly girls from South Asian communities –
are forced into marriage every year in the UK. Karma Nirvana
operates a national helpline that has dealt with over 30,000 calls
since its inception in 2008.
The Forced Marriage Unit dealt with 1,485 cases in 2012 of
which 13 per cent were under 13. The government has also said
that we are dealing with the ‘tip of the iceberg’ as forced
marriage becomes a criminal offence in the course of 2014.
The high profile murder trial of Shafilea Ahmed in 2012
underlined how many victims live within a hermetically sealed
cultural environment. Shafilea was encouraged to mediate with
her perpetrators even though her abuses included being beaten,
abused, imprisoned and abducted mainly because she wanted to
lead a normal British life. Justice Roderick Evans said she lived
in two worlds – the relatively free world of school and the other
home world where she was in rural Pakistan and seen by her
parents to be dishonouring her family for being a normal
adolescent teenager. The prosecuting barrister Andrew Edis QC
described the lives of many in Britain when stating how within
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this family dynamic you have three choices to, ‘escape, submit 
or die.’
The ITV documentary Forced to Marry broadcast on ITV on
9 October 2013 revealed how two undercover reporters called 56
mosques asking if they would perform the marriage of a 14-year-
old girl. Two thirds of those contacted refused to perform the
marriage, and many of them made it clear they found the request
abhorrent. But 18 of the respondents agreed stating how this
would not be a problem and the ensuing conversations were all
about how tradition, religion and culture were stronger than any
British laws.
Another documentary the BBC Panorama (2012) Britain’s
Crimes of Honour highlighted how thousands of crimes in Britain
are going unreported. Also, the programme conducted a poll
that revealed the support for honour systems was not dying out
with the older generations, rather, two-thirds of young British
Asians agreed that families should live according to the concept
of ‘honour.’ Of the 500 young Asians questioned 18 per cent also
felt that certain behaviours by women which damaged her
family’s honour justified physical punishment.
Many individuals who are currently seeking to join the
British way of life are placing themselves at risk of being cast out
or attacked. It will be a long hard struggle to root out the
honour culture which continues to break the lives of young
women who glimpse a world outside the village in the city.
Jasvinder Sanghera is founder and CEO of the charity Karma Nirvana,
which supports victims and survivors of forced marriage and honour-
based abuse.
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12 Is there a positive case
for segregation in a
liberal society?
Michael S. Merry
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In the early twenty-first century, copious environments –
particularly the workplace – are more mixed than ever before.
Occasionally, too, spatial mixing yields substantive interaction
cutting across real differences. Yet across the world, most societies
remain deeply segregated by ethnicity, language, class, religion
and political creed. Given the ignominious historical associations
that attach to segregation in certain times and places, its
continued persistence for many is alarming, an affliction crying
out for a remedy. Indeed, with good reason, many will see
segregation in itself as evidence of injustice. From this conviction
it follows that any social inequities occasioned by segregation
can only be mitigated through policies more carefully fine-tuned
to achieve ethnic, racial or social class ‘integration’.
Noteworthy in most discussions is how imprecise the
concept of integration is. Conservatives and liberals alike employ
the term to mean different things, though it is safe to say that
‘integration’ is nearly always directed towards minority groups
and is meant to signify things like first language or religious
preference, educational success, labour market participation,
endorsement of mainstream cultural values, and even attitudes
and dispositions with respect to various institutional norms. For
my purposes, it will suffice to say that, by integration, most
persons imagine environments that are spatially mixed on many
fronts, but also mixed in terms of more substantive interaction –
formally and informally – involving greater levels of social
cooperation across various markers of identity and status.
Whether implicitly or explicitly, the integration narrative
typically is framed by two principles: equality and citizenship.
With equality we find the belief that by mixing persons from
different backgrounds – and perhaps especially socioeconomic
backgrounds – we will bring the less fortunate into contact with
the more fortunate and these opportunities for mixing will grant
the former access to the cultural and social capital of the latter.
The result ostensibly will be greater upward mobility for the less
fortunate by gaining access to the relevant social networks and
resources that the privileged enjoy. And with citizenship we find
the belief that by mixing persons from different backgrounds we
will reduce prejudice, remove stereotypes and generally aid in
fostering harmonious interactions between those who otherwise
might be inclined to view one another with suspicion. The
outcomes ostensibly will lead to greater levels of mutual
cooperation, greater social cohesion and a healthier body politic.
Variations of the integration argument can be found in the
housing, business and labour market literature, but without
question it is most often heard in the educational domain. Yet the
idea that mixed school environments will yield more justice
seems as presumptuous as it does improbable, particularly when
the scholarly literature documents the same phenomena year
after year, namely: (a) high levels of spatial clustering in neigh-
bourhoods with both voluntary and involuntary causes; (b)
sorting and selection mechanisms schools use that produce
segregation from within; and (c) how disciplinary procedures
and special education labels disproportionately affect poor 
and minority groups. Added to these structural phenomena,
parents enjoy rights and protections to choose where to live and
which school their child will attend; even children express
preferences about those with whom they like to spend their 
time. Meanwhile, many concerns expressed by those most
egregiously affected by segregation are routinely dismissed or
ignored. Indeed, appeals made by disadvantaged (and often
stigmatised) minority groups for pragmatic alternatives to the
standard integration narrative are repudiated by those who
continue to advocate for more integration.
Perhaps it is time to reassess, for it is doubtful whether
integration is always or even often the most sensible or effective
strategy to foster greater equality and citizenship. First, a single-
minded defence of integration is naive, given persistent facts
about the reasons behind both involuntary and voluntary forms
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of segregation. Second, while it may be true that under special
conditions integration can promote equality and citizenship, the
conditions conducive to these outcomes typically are hard to
come by, especially for the less fortunate. Third, many forms of
segregation not only facilitate greater equality and citizenship
than we may be prepared to admit; these also may be a more
realistic course to follow in pursuing justice. In what follows I
only begin to sketch the outlines of an argument for pursuing
justice for stigmatised minority groups under non-ideal
conditions, i.e., persistently high levels of segregation. In an
attempt to capture creative manoeuvres that respond to existing
segregated conditions, I adopt the provocative label ‘voluntary
separation’. By voluntary separation (hereafter VS), I refer to a
pragmatic and only partially institutionalised response by certain –
usually disadvantaged and stigmatised – minority groups to existing
segregated conditions.
Now, because I know how quickly many readers will
stumble on this choice of words, let me explain how I am using
these terms. By ‘pragmatic’ I simply refer to strategies that
creatively resist, rearrange and reclaim the terms of one’s
segregation. ‘Voluntary’ is trickier because all voluntary actions
are of course structured – and constrained – by innumerable
involuntary realities. The poor generally have fewer liberties than
the rich; the disabled generally have fewer liberties than the able-
bodied; and, in the West, Hindus generally have fewer liberties
than Christians (though in India it is the other way around). At
the same time, many forms of clustering do not occur simply
because of structural barriers. In fact, both the voluntary and the
involuntary often intertwine: for example, housing
discrimination and a desire to live near others similar to oneself
often coincide, producing spatial concentrations.
But there is every reason to believe that Pakistani
concentrations in Birmingham, Cuban concentrations in Miami
or Turkish concentrations in Rotterdam would exist even in the
absence of racism or discrimination. More to the point, not
being able to choose one’s original predicament does not mean
that one is unable to turn spatial concentration to one’s
advantage. Hence it is proper to refer to various forms of
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segregation as ‘voluntary’ to the extent that there is intentionality
behind decisions and actions to circumstances not necessarily of
one’s choosing. It is voluntary – and not, say, merely involuntary
or ‘reactive’ – because the latter implies either victimhood or a
loath defensiveness not typically present in efforts to redefine
and redirect what it means to pursue justice.
VS, as I defend it, adopts the exact same framing principles
used in the integration account. That is to say, one cannot simply
claim that a voluntary or separate status will suffice for justice.
Certain enabling conditions also will need to be present. These might
include things like neighbourhood safety, social networks,
entrepreneurial opportunities, qualified teachers, transportation
infrastructure, etc. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that
separation is capable of producing certain outcomes. Groups claiming
‘voluntary separation’ that violate the basic principles of equality
and citizenship – neighbourhood associations that exclude
others because of ethnic/racial difference, for example – are
without defence. However, I argue that so long as the right kinds
of enabling conditions are present (or can be fostered), VS is
every bit as capable – and in many instances even more so – of
producing important forms of equality and citizenship. Indeed,
within segregated communities one may be able to promote
greater equality of recognition, treatment and self-respect than
one is likely to find in mixed environments. Moreover,
segregated communities often produce many forms of civic
virtue necessary for ‘bonding’ communities together, but also for
‘bridging’ with others whose communities may be organised
around a different set of concerns. Fostering strong communal
ties is not inherently inimical to broader expressions of equality
and citizenship. Rather, doing so often serves as the foundation
upon which broader expressions of mutual concern and
collective action can occur.
Certain things follow from this. First, as a pragmatic
strategy VS affords persons the right to be with others like
themselves if they want to. Voluntary association is in any case a
normative good. And it turns out that minority groups in
particular often have reason to stay together for the benefits such
proximity affords. Those benefits may include a shared
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language, cultural or religious background, but also shared
appreciation for what it means to be a minority in a society that
to one degree or another fails to demonstrate equal recognition
or treatment. Those most likely to adopt VS as an appealing
strategy will be members of groups subjected to various harms
and stigma. Strength can be found in solidarity. Indeed,
organised efforts to resist discrimination and oppression typically
benefit from spatial concentrations of persons who share similar
backgrounds, characteristics and concerns. Of course, these same
groups also will want to foster a variety of enabling conditions
necessary for flourishing and justice, and institutional supports
always help to achieve these goals. Even so, their success does
not depend upon an environment being ‘integrated’, at least not
in the sense in which integration advocates typically understand
this term. In any case, there is not likely to be justice when
dominant groups – and the privileged in particular – continue to
view stigmatised minorities either with pity or contempt.
Second, even under conditions of concentrated
disadvantage, possibilities for redefining and redirecting what it
means to be ‘separate’ are feasible. Institutional levers certainly
can help by, say, adopting weighted pupil funding strategies or
subsidising after-school programmes. But as Robert Sampson’s
work on ‘collective efficacy’ also powerfully demonstrates, ‘by
cultivating a sense of ownership and cultural commitment to the
neighbourhood, residents [can] produce a social resource that
feeds on itself and serves as a kind of independent protective
factor and durable character that encourages action in the face of
adversity.’1 As conditions improve and social attitudes change,
stigma and disadvantage slowly dissipate for some groups; for
others, it remains an ongoing struggle. But the struggle rarely is for
more spatial mixing; rather, with strong attachments both to place
and other group members who share similar attributes and
concerns, the struggle is for an alleviation of poverty, safer living
conditions, improved educational opportunities, and an
expansion of meaningful prospects in the labour market.
Summing up, insofar as VS is instantiated in communities
and schools it is driven among other things by a desire for equal
recognition and status, as well as community membership and
89
self-respect. Under the right conditions and with the right
purposes in mind, VS is a justifiable response to social inequality
where parity of recognition, treatment and participation in
integrated environments often is in short supply. None of this
entails a repudiation of integration as an ideal; nor does my
argument entail the denial of significant gains that increased
levels of integration have occasioned. Indeed, to the extent that
integrationist ideals take a long-term view of a more just society,
they continue to serve an important purpose; they embody goals
whose aim is to facilitate a pursuit of justice, even if its actualised
expressions much of the time continue to elude us. Nor do I
claim that VS offers a miracle cure; sometimes it will work and
sometimes not. Much depends upon the specific circumstances,
the features and aims of the group in question, and the presence
or absence of relevant enabling conditions. But notice that this is
also the case with so-called integrated environments.2
In arguing that we re-think the terms and demands of
integration, I hope at least three additional points for
consideration ensue. First, I hope that many of us will be more
candid about our own decisions and actions, particularly with
regard to where we choose to live and send our own children to
school. The fact remains that many of us who publicly register
our dismay about segregation and affirm our commitment to
integrated neighbourhoods and schools, too often exercise our
own voluntary prerogatives in ways that support the status quo.
Second, there is something odd about the mainstream view that
only minority concentrations are problematic. Rarely does one
read about the need to ‘disrupt’ the spatial concentrations of
majority groups. Integration arguments almost always assume
that minorities need to move towards – and adapt themselves to
– majority populations and norms and demonstrate that they are
integrated by accessing what dominant groups allegedly possess.
But this is a deeply prejudicial belief about minority concentra-
tions at best, and often it is unwittingly subversive of what many
minority groups have reason to care about and pursue. Finally, I
hope that more of us will even-handedly assess whether integra-
tion under non-ideal conditions – as defined by members of
dominant groups – is really capable of ushering in justice for
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those who need it most. It just may be that many types of VS not
only do a better job of facilitating valuable forms of equality and
citizenship, they may do so in a way that simultaneously affirms
the crucial importance of voluntary association.
Michael S. Merry is Professor of Philosophy of Education at the
University of Amsterdam and author of Equality, Citizenship and
Segregation: a defense of separation (Palgrave Macmillan).
Notes
91
1 Sampson, R, 2012. Great American City: Chicago and the enduring
neighbourhood effect. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p 398.
2 For a more exhaustive theoretical and empirical examination 
of these matters, see Merry, M S, Equality, Citizenship and
Segregation: a defense of separation. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013.
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Keighley is my home; it is where I went to school and where I
first entered the world of employment – in a chip shop. In 2010 I
was elected as Keighley’s MP. The chance to represent the
interests of your constituents is a great honour, but even more so
when it is your own community you are being invited to serve.
In my maiden speech, I described my seat as the jewel in
the nation’s crown, and I meant it. But Keighley is not a place
without its difficulties.
While parts of my constituency are very affluent, others –
particularly in the town of Keighley itself – are among the most
deprived in the country. And economic prosperity is not the sole
divider, because racial and cultural differences also continue to
play their part.
To understand these, it is important to appreciate the
recent history of Keighley. In common with other neighbouring
towns and cities in the north, Muslims now make up the second
largest religious group in Keighley, with more than 13 per cent
according to the 2011 census. This historic change in population
trend stems from the 1950s when significant numbers of
immigrants began to arrive from the Mirpur region of Azad
Kashmir, in Pakistan, and the Sylhet region of Bangladesh. This
happened primarily at the invitation of employers who needed to
fill vacancies in the thriving local mills.
The workers who arrived came with a strong work ethic
and a desire to get on in life. Many of them wanted to buy
houses and did so. But, through time, the decline of the textile
industry – prompted by fully automated manufacturing
processes and the availability of cheaper labour overseas – led to
the closure of mills and the loss of jobs.
This had a particularly negative impact on immigrant
workers. And it meant that their children would not, in the main,
have the same opportunities as their parents to get on and 
make their contribution to society. Other factors also began to
create a divide between the indigenous population and those of
South Asia.
Primary among them was the custom for young British
South Asian men to find a bride in Pakistan, a bride who often
did not speak English and had little opportunity to learn the
language. This, in turn, led to their children not hearing English
spoken in the home and not being properly exposed to the
language until, at the very earliest, they were enrolled at nursery.
A tradition also evolved, one which I believe to be detri-
mental, of families from British South Asian backgrounds
choosing to live closely together and thereby having minimal
contact with others outside their ethnic group.
As a pupil attending middle school in central Keighley in
the mid-1970s, I can only recall three British South Asian
children among my classmates. It was a time when the National
Front was desperately seeking to stoke up local racist tensions. 
I remember being shocked when a young British South Asian
boy was the victim of a pre-meditated racist attack at a bus 
stop; the two white boys were even more shocked when I inter-
vened to stop it. Many more racially-motivated assaults have
happened since then, with both whites and British South Asians
bearing responsibility.
Territorial conflicts have often been behind these, as
segregation in housing became entrenched, and these were
exacerbated by further drug wars between rival South Asian
gangs. The drugs also tended to be sold mainly to white 
users – with the police in those days, but thankfully no longer,
often turning a blind eye – which increased local community
tensions further.
In more recent years, Keighley has attracted negative
publicity because of a high profile problem of paedophilia and
sexual grooming. This is the most harrowing issue I have had to
deal with in my 16 years in public life as a ward councillor,
council leader and, more recently, as the MP. Like my Labour
predecessor Ann Cryer, I have spoken out against these crimes
many times. But my speech to the House of Commons in
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November 2012 caused a furore because I concentrated my
remarks on the sickening activities and behaviour of some British
Pakistani men in this country, including in Keighley.
As I said then and repeat again, the vast majority of child
abusers in this country are white. But it is a simple fact that a
small minority of British Pakistani men are working together in
gangs and actively targeting white underage girls for sex, and
committing acts of rape, in a model identified by the Home
Office as street grooming. As we know from a series of well-
publicised court cases across the country, it is happening in lots
of places, particularly across the north in towns such as Keighley,
and it must be stopped.
Looking ahead, is the town now on a better path? Most
certainly. The BNP Leader Nick Griffin was overwhelmingly
rejected by voters across the constituency at the 2005 General
Election. And the close cooperation between the police and the
South Asian community in dealing with a recent English Defence
League rally has done much to strengthen bridges of trust.
But there are still some harsh truths to be faced if we want
to maintain Keighley on a positive trajectory. A better education
for our younger people is essential, and this begins with doing
what we can to encourage parents to take proper responsibility
for their child’s learning, including ensuring that they arrive at
school with the ability to speak good English. And this is not
just an issue for the South Asian community; it is also the case
that many white children enrol at primary school with speech
and language problems which can be traced back to the home.
While we have a fast-growing young population in
Keighley – almost 21 per cent of residents in the constituency are
aged 15 or under according to the 2011 census – we must turn
them into an aspirational, ambitious, and talented workforce in
waiting. And they must be taught the social skills to enable them
to interact and integrate with the whole of the community, not
just those of their own ethnic group. In segregated communities,
school is often the only place where cross-cultural and inter-
racial integration takes place on a regular basis, and where
familiarity and tolerance can be nurtured and developed.
Keighley schools are already playing a lead role in this process,
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and we must encourage more inter-school activities such as sport
and drama, particularly between institutions where either white
or South Asian pupils are dominant.
We need also to find ways to encourage more leadership by
local women. We must challenge the male dominated culture in
the South Asian community, and find ways to empower South
Asian women and help them to gain more influence inside and
outside the home. We need to do this, not only because it is
right, but because the tradition of patriarchy in that community
contributes to its economic poverty. In my experience, mum is
not only best placed to instil ambition and aspiration into boys
but also, crucially, girls. And, indeed, this applies to white
working class communities too where, in some homes, no one
has worked for more than a generation. Increased investment in
society will surely only bring benefits to mothers and confidence
to their children.
Finally, on child grooming, we require more leading
members of the South Asian community in Keighley to stand up,
condemn what has been going on and encourage all useful
information about those suspected of involvement to be passed
to the police. Over recent months, this has happened with
significant numbers of arrests being made as a consequence. For
my own part, I am pleased that the Government has accepted my
proposals to give the police more powers to tackle organised
child sexual exploitation in hotels and bed-and-breakfasts. The
confidence that will be generated by being seen to work together,
across all ethnic groups, to deal with this scourge on our
community will do nothing but good.
In conclusion, despite living in the X Factor age where
people now demand immediate results, it is hard graft, forward-
thinking and goodwill that will bring the positive benefits for
Keighley that all of us who care about the area wish to reap.
Given time, I believe that our town – my town – can be regarded
nationally as a model for religious tolerance, ethnic mix and
community engagement.
Kris Hopkins is Minister for Housing and the Conservative Member of
Parliament for Keighley.
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14 On the Ground 2: Tower
Hamlets and Newham
Max Wind-Cowie
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It is tempting, when it comes to policy questions as complex and
apparently intractable as that of integration, to look for what has
worked elsewhere in the world. Why can’t we be more like the
Canadians? Or the Swedes? Or – less frequently and less under-
standably – the French? The truth is, of course, in asking such a
question one is really no better off than when asking ‘why aren’t
humans more like seagulls?’ We simply are not. The Canadian
experience of mass immigration has been more controlled, less
focused at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum and
takes place in the context of almost limitless space. The Swedish
have not been quite as successful as some outsiders imagine - as
demonstrated by the recent riots in immigrant communities - and
besides which they are smaller and richer than we are. And the
French? Well, I need hardly labour the differences.
No. If we are to look for practical examples of what may
work in terms of integration then it is far better that we look to
smaller but more relevant examples closer to home in Britain
itself. What has happened in different communities struggling to
deal with sudden and significant diversity – here in the UK – can
educate us in what might work, in what factors point to relative
success, what kind of political processes lend themselves to
positive integration and, crucially, what does not work. For the
purposes of this essay I intend to look at two communities,
chosen for their geographical proximity to one another and for
the radically different paths that they have taken.
Newham and Tower Hamlets
Newham and Tower Hamlets are boroughs of London that
nestle, next to each other, on the eastern edge of the city. Neither
is particularly wealthy. But both populations live within sight of
the riches of the City and both are well connected to central
London. They are very alike yet are distinct in terms of their
make-up and their local cultures.
Newham has an estimated population of 307,984,
according to the 2011 Census – and it is growing fast. Newham
grew by around 64,000 people in the period between the 2001
census and 2011; this is a 23.5 per cent increase and is equal to
the second highest growth in the country (http://www.aston-
mansfield.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/FINAL-
Newham-Profile-April-2013.docx). It is also one of the most
ethnically diverse areas in the UK. 
Newham has the lowest White British population in the
whole of England and Wales – with just 16.7 per cent of
residents, as well as both the second highest Bangladeshi and
fourth largest Black African populations in the UK. But when we
talk about Newham’s diversity it is important to remember that
we are using that term in its original context. There are many
and multiple different communities living in Newham – not two
or three competing blocs of ethnic groups. Almost every ethnic
identity known to man can be found on the streets of Newham –
as the table below illustrates.
Tower Hamlets shares a land border with Newham and a
great deal of cultural history, both being the core part of
London’s traditional ‘East End’. Tower Hamlets has around
237,900 residents and is one of London’s most densely populated
areas. It too is ‘mixed’ – although the population is very much
more strikingly divided. 53 per cent of Tower Hamlets’ residents
are White British and 30 per cent are Bangladeshi. The next
largest ethnic population are Indians – who represent just 2 per
cent of the population. 
While Tower Hamlets is certainly not a monolithically
white neighbourhood, I would ask whether these breakdowns as
compared to Newham’s point to a community that can genuinely
be described as ‘diverse’ at all. In Newham, six distinct ethnic
groups comprise 10 per cent or more of the population. In Tower
Hamlets there are two such groups. Newham has drawn signifi-
cant proportions of its populations from Europe, Britain, Africa
and the Indian sub-continent. Tower Hamlets has managed to
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distill the bulk of its population into two camps of origin –
Britain and Bangladesh. 
These differences are not anyone’s fault. They are the
product of a number of interlocking factors that are largely the
cumulative product of behaviour rather than the deliberate design
of policy. Nevertheless, these intrinsic differences are hugely
significant to the long-term direction of both communities.
Politics and power
Newham and Tower Hamlets also share a political system. Both
boroughs have adopted the ‘Executive Mayor’ system of
government – meaning that both directly elect a leader who then
interacts with the local council in much the same way as a
President does with his or her legislature. This invests
considerable power in the hands of the elected executive –
something that was widely regarded as a positive development in
these areas’ regeneration. Having a single individual who can
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Table 1 Population of Newham by ethnicity
Ethnic Group %
White British 16.7
Indian 13.8
Black African 12.3
Bangladeshi 12.1
White Other 11.4
Pakistani 9.8
Other Asian 6.5
Black Caribbean 4.9
Mixed White & Black Caribbean 1.3
Other Mixed 1.3
Chinese 1.3
Mixed White & Black African 1.1
Mixed White & Asian 0.9
White Irish 0.7
White Gypsy or Irish Traveller 0.2
Other Black 2.4
Arab 1.1
Any Other 2.3
drive policy, make representations on behalf of the borough and
be held personally accountable means that strong leadership
becomes possible in places that require it. But the ‘Executive
Mayor’ model also significantly raises the stakes. In a council
election it is often necessary for coalitions to be built – both
inside and outside political parties. Electing a single individual
to exercise often sweeping power strips away both these
requirements to compromise. It is a win-all scenario.
In Newham, the mayor is Sir Robin Wales – a Labour
politician who has successfully established himself and his party
as the only real power in the land. At the last local elections,
Labour won every single seat on Newham Council. In Tower
Hamlets, the Mayor is the ‘Independent’ Lutfur Rahman - who
was elected following a bitter dispute within the local Labour
Party, characterised by a stark division between local white
British and ethnic minority activists and a bloc of predominantly
Bangladeshi discontents led by Rahman. Amidst accusations of
Islamist links and financial mismanagement, Rahman managed
to beat the official Labour candidate and take power in Tower
Hamlets. The Council is also bitterly divided. A mix of
‘Independent’ and ‘Respect’ Councillors offer succour to the
mayor while they are opposed by Labour members and a
smattering of Conservatives. Speak to any Labour or
Conservative Councillor in Tower Hamlets and you will hear
stories of division, smears, homophobic, sexist and racial slurs
and an atmosphere of mutual contempt. It is a mess.
Why? Why is Tower Hamlets politics broken while in
Newham there is such breathtaking unity? I am not here to 
argue that single party rule in Newham is necessarily healthy 
but it is surely preferable to the stark and discomfortingly 
ethnic lines along which Tower Hamlets appears to have
degenerated? And the proof – from the integrationist’s
perspective – is in the pudding.
Wales has made a great deal of his personal mission to
drive forward integration and ethnic cohesion in Newham. The
list of initiatives is long and occasionally esoteric – taking in
everything from the withdrawal of non-English publications in
libraries to the provision of music lessons to all Newham
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children in order to create a shared language in music. Sir Robin
has also overseen controversial decisions designed to break down
ethnic division by ensuring that public funds never contribute to
isolation and segregation. He has refused, for example, to make
funds available to single-ethnicity groups for celebration events.
It’s not that you can’t celebrate being Bangladeshi in Newham at
the council’s expense. It is simply that you cannot celebrate
being Bangladeshi among only Bangladeshis and expect the
taxpayer to foot the bill – you have to open up and play with the
rest of Newham if you want public subsidies.
Contrast with Tower Hamlets, where disputes over the
provision of council funds are mired in debate and controversy -
often with an unhealthy emphasis on ethnic competition. In
December to February 2010/2011, for example, Mayor Rahman
used his office to direct £150,000 to three Mosques which some
allege are involved in extremism (http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/
news/andrewgilligan/100082445/lutfur-rahman-council-pays-at-
least-50000-a-month-to-front-organisations-for-extremist-ife/).
The resulting controversy demonstrated the level of fear and
anxiety that resulted from the election of a man who is perceived
by many as the representative of just one of Tower Hamlets’ two
competing ethnic groups. The Bangladeshi community has
‘captured’ City Hall and, so the anxiety runs, are now using it to
fund friends and consolidate power. 
While Robin Wales emphasises harmony within his hyper-
diverse community, Lutfur Rahman can sometimes appear happy
to sow the seeds of further separation. 
The reasons for these differences can, I believe, be found in
the simple arithmetic of demographics. The genuine diversity of
Newham enables an emphasis on integration because no single
group is strong enough as a voting bloc to demand special
attention and treatment. Wales is free to take controversial
decisions in relation to race and religion – in the interests of
wider holistic community of Newham – because he does not owe
his power to a particular interest group. Rahman is not. Even if
he wanted to, Rahman is less free to make decisions that de-
prioritise sectional interests within his core support group of
Bangladeshi residents because they are simply too large a part of
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the electorate. This is less of an issue among ethnic groups where
traditional community hierarchies have largely broken down and
individual needs therefore trump collective needs at the ballot
box. But where the ties of ethnic and religious obligation still
predominate it is a real and pressing problem – especially if such
a community represents one of only two significant communities
within a political space.
Another example of how demographics affects decision
making can be seen in the Newham Mayor’s decision on the
development of a ‘super-Mosque’ in the area. Wales declined 
the planning application – partially on the grounds that such a
large and imposing development might destabilise the
community cohesion that Newham has worked so hard to build.
The Mayor is known to admit privately that his decision would
have been impossible in a place like next-door Tower Hamlets.
Saying ‘no’ to such a significant ethno-religious bloc would be
political suicide.
What can we learn?
On the Left, many critics of the immigration and integration
debate like to tell us that it is not about culture or language or
manners but rather resources. In a competition for resources it is
inevitable that ‘migrants’ get the blame, they say. Fine. But
resources and politics are inextricably linked in our country and
so a concern for how politics and power work is absolutely
necessary if cohesion and social harmony are your objective.
Newham and Tower Hamlets demonstrate how the pre-existing
demographic mix of a community can contribute to either
virtuous or vicious circles of integration and segregation. 
True diversity acts as a curb on mono-ethnic domination 
and on inter-ethnic competition. Being a community divided
into two ethnic populations creates the potential for inter-
ethnic competition and a ‘winner-takes-all’ approach to 
political power.
We need to take this seriously if we wish to prevent
segregation and promote integration. I propose two macro-
proposals to take these lessons into account and one
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recommendation for how we might tackle the specific problems
of Tower Hamlets.
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1 A statutory duty to integration: Local authorities should have and
solicit a statutory duty to ‘promote integration’, rather than to
merely support ‘social cohesion’. This duty would harden the
obligation on public bodies to support and promote the active
integration of differing ethnic groups with one another. This is
not about prescribing the Newham approach – different
interventions will work in different ways in different places – but
it is about making integration central to the objectives of public
bodies.
2 Ethnic boundary reviews: There has been much recent discussion
and debate about how to equalise constituency population
boundaries in England and Wales. That debate emphasises the
fairness of having equal numbers of voters, constituency by
constituency – but the ethnic make-up of constituencies can also
be important. The Electoral Commission should consider
whether it is possible to look at the ethnic mix of potential
constituencies to examine whether they have an electorate that
reflects, in ethnic terms, the make-up of the wider area of which a
constituency is part. For example, in London, whether proposed
new constituencies genuinely reflect the overall genuine diversity
of the city. (Similar thinking might be applied to school
catchment areas.)
And what about Tower Hamlets? Frankly, I think we
should abolish it. It is a borough that has, in part because of
demographics, descended into a poisonous and unhealthy
politics of ethnic division. It doesn’t need to be that way. We
should break up the borough and incorporate elements of it 
into the surrounding boroughs so that the particular demo-
graphics of Tower Hamlets are watered down and so that real
democratic participation and integration are possible. This
would be a radical step. But it is better than simply hoping to
play Rahman at his own game and win back power for
mainstream politics. The divide is real and it is intractable. The
answer is to start afresh.
Overall, we can learn from East London more than we can
from international examples. Demographics affect, and
sometimes dictate, politics and power. You can see that in action
in East London. We need to intervene in the demographics,
ensure that as far as possible diversity is real, if we want to use
our democratic politics to promote a virtuous circle of
integration rather than a vicious cycle of separateness.
Max Wind-Cowie is a Demos Associate and former Head of the
Integration programme at Demos.
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15 Conclusion
David Goodhart
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Just before Christmas I spoke at a BBC debate in Birmingham
about immigration. The audience was a combination of middle
class white liberals and a more socially diverse ethnic minority
mix, some of whom were unafraid to express their dismay at
competition from east European immigrants. But at one point I
unintentionally united the whole audience against me. 
A retired white policeman spoke up to say that amid all the
discussion of the economics of immigration something had been
forgotten: love. He was referring to his wife from the Caribbean.
Later I pointed out that, sadly, the policeman’s story is rather
unusual, and that relatively few immigrants of the post-colonial
wave from the 50s to the late 80s did come here and marry white
Brits – I quoted the very small figure for marrying/partnering
‘out’ by South Asians, especially South Asian Muslims, but
added that the big exception to this story was African-Caribbean
men, almost half of whom partner out. These facts were met with
howls of protest by the audience and by most of my fellow
panelists, one of whom told me I was being horribly insensitive.
I was surprised by the reaction. But it was a useful
reminder, in the light of this essay collection, that there are some
things that remain banal in a seminar room yet hard to express
on a public platform. Generalising about the patterns of
behaviour of different ethnic groups, including patterns of
mixing with the majority population – even when based on solid
facts – can still be seen as insensitive. This sensitivity arises in
part from the history of racial stereotyping and derogatory
generalisations about minorities that were still commonplace 30
years ago. But it is time that we moved on. Of course, everyone is
an individual; ethno-cultural background is not destiny and
many people float free from their roots. But as everyone also
knows there is such a thing as society and society is in part made
up of groups. Modern liberals are often uneasy about group
attachment: ‘What’s the fuss, we are all just individuals aren’t
we?’ But group attachments of many kinds remain strong.
Societies are composed of people who come from places and
social networks, speak in a certain way, have certain traditions
and ways of doing things (the idea of multiculturalism is partly
premised on the overwhelming importance of these traditions 
to people).
To give a simple example relating to differences in ethnic
minority social mobility: people of East African Asian
background in Britain invariably go to good universities and
into well paid professional jobs and people of Kashmiri Pakistani
background, whose families have usually been in Britain longer,
are often still driving taxis or working in restaurants. This is
neither a mass coincidence nor is it to do with genes or race, it is
rather to do with different cultural habits and different starting
points; as Shamit Saggar points out in his essay, East African
Asians had many advantages over Kashmiri Pakistanis when they
began arriving in the late-1960s.
The Demos Mapping Integration project wants to make
well-grounded generalisations about integration/segregation,
and the different patterns of minority life that have a bearing on
it, as commonplace as discussions of social class. We need to
narrow, if not completely close, that gap between the seminar
room and the wider public debate. 
The actual integration story in Britain is varied. On the one
hand there is a story of declining discrimination, an increase in
mixed race children, upwardly mobile minorities and
unselfconsciously mixed suburbs. But elsewhere there is also a
story of white (and brown) exit and parallel lives—and what
Robert Putnam has called ‘hunkering down’ – especially in parts
of the north of England. Most people from the white British
majority are resistant to becoming the minority in any given area
and this has led to almost half of the ethnic minority population
of Britain living in wards that are less than 50 per cent white
British. Is that too much ethnic clustering for a good society?
There is no clear answer to that question but we now know
so much about so many things relating to the new patterns of life
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in Britain that ignorance of the trends themselves is inexcusable.
And as the ethnic minority population (including white
minorities) of England and Wales has surged ahead from around
7 per cent in the mid-1990s to close to 25 per cent two decades
later our knowledge of patterns of clustering and dispersal in
housing, jobs, schooling and so on is surely of enormous value to
politicians and policy makers. 
For this reason, at the heart of the Demos Mapping
Integration project will be the Integration Hub website. This
will, when completed, offer a user-friendly, overview of our
understanding of these complex matters. By pulling together in
one place some of the vast amounts of information held in
government, academic and private sector databases we want to
offer an authoritative, politically neutral resource for the 
country, one which showcases the invaluable work that
academics and government statisticians have been doing in this
field over recent years. 
Our plan is to subdivide the integration-segregation story
into five main chapters on the website – residence, education,
economy (including employment and welfare), social (including
leisure, relationships and well-being) and attitudes (including
religion, politics and national identity). These will then be
further broken down into four areas of focus: a headline
overview, the recent history of whatever is under scrutiny, the
local and regional story, and, finally, the debate about what it all
means and different analysis offered by the experts.
There are no simple answers to the conundrums of
integration and segregation in liberal societies, and we will not
always know what the policy implications are of the data we are
gathering together. Reasonable people disagree not only about
the main obstacles to integration – crudely, how much is due to
racism/poverty and how much to the internal cultures of the
more separate minority groups – but also about what an
integrated society looks like.
On the other hand most people also accept the desirability
of some convergence in social and economic outcomes and in
everyday norms and understandings, and therefore the need for
reliable knowledge about these trends. But perhaps, as Trevor
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Phillips points out in his opening essay, the one thing we can
truly all agree on is that it is valid to have mixed feelings about
the whole idea of integration. While recognising that powerful
‘people like us’ feelings persist in many communities, placing
strict limits on the desire to mix, we also believe that a decent
society is one with lots of contact between citizens and a sense of
mutual recognition across lines of difference. Helping to forge a
degree of political consensus on how to navigate between these
poles is at the heart of the Mapping Integration story.
Modern colour-blind liberalism demands, rightly, that
everyone be treated the same; but that does not mean that
everyone is the same. And that raises issues about how we live
together: about contact, trust and familiarity, about areas people
feel comfortable living in and areas they don’t, schools they are
happy to send their children to and those they are not. 
Debate about these matters requires not only a less nervous
attitude to the realities of ethnic difference than my Birmingham
audience displayed but also an acceptance of the desire for
people of both majority and minority backgrounds to favour
communities that are stable and familiar. People can, of course,
trust and cooperate with people who do not look or sound like
them but it is easier to do so when change is gradual.
And we need, here, to recognise the existence of what one
might call legitimate asymmetries between majority and minority
behaviour. For example, it is now accepted that a degree of
everyday ethnic solidarity is justifiable for minorities in a way
that it has not been for the majority community since the 1960s.
Similarly, should we not accept the preference of majority
Britons to remain part of the preponderant group where they
live, something that is seldom a realistic possibility for
minorities? If we want to prevent white exit we should start with
a less censorious attitude towards the ‘exiters’, especially as Eric
Kaufmann’s essay shows that exit is not primarily motivated by
racial discomfort.
There is in fact plenty of polling evidence to suggest that
people want to live in more mixed communities than they
actually do. There will of course be many different definitions of
mixed but it seems difficult to maintain communities that have
Conclusion
the sort of 70:30 majority/minority balance that most people in
both groups say they are happy with.
This is part of the justification for thinking hard about 
how policy might nudge us in the direction that we say we want
to go – in relation to where we live, who our children go to
school with and so on. This requires respecting peoples’ intui-
tions about familiarity and continuity while also encouraging
greater mixing and comfort with ethnic difference. Policy here is
an inexact science; we are feeling our way and the Demos
Mapping Integration project intends to be at the centre of the
unfolding debate.
David Goodhart is Director of Demos and leads the Mapping
Integration project.
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MAPPING INTEGRATION
Edited by David Goodhart
Few topics inspire more heat and less light than integration. A
debate on the topic can cover all manner of subjects including
demographic change, social relationships across ethnic
boundaries, the interaction between race and social class, and
questions of national identity and cultural adherence. As a
consequence, integration has the distinction of being a public
policy question which can become less intelligible the more it
is aired. But these questions aren’t mere debating points: they
have huge potential societal impact.
As this collection reveals, there is a great deal of data out
there on the British integration story, and it shows a varied
picture. On the one hand there is a story of declining
discrimination, an increase in mixed race children, upwardly
mobile minorities and unselfconsciously mixed suburbs. But
elsewhere there is also a story of parallel lives and what Robert
Putnam has called ‘hunkering down’. The real concern about
segregation is two-fold. First, is it likely to undermine social
peace and solidarity? And second, will it deprive any group 
of opportunity, or reduce their life chances? 
Our contributors offer some suggestions. And while it’s
too early to draw too many conclusions, what they say
challenges us to look afresh at the question of ethnic diversity
and its impact on our wellbeing. For this reason, this
collection marks the launch of the Demos Mapping
Integration project, which will have the Integration Hub
website at its heart. This will, when completed, pull together
existing data held by government, academic and private
sector organisations to offer a user-friendly, authoritative and
politically neutral overview of our understanding of these
complex matters. In so doing, it hopes to close the gap
between the ordinary voter and policymakers on a vital but
sensitive subject.
David Goodhart is Director of Demos and leads the Mapping
Integration project.
M
a
p
p
i
n
g
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
|
E
d
i
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
D
a
v
i
d
 
G
o
o
d
h
a
r
t
ISBN 978-1-909037-57-1 £10
© Demos 2014
Mapping cover  25/2/14  6:27 pm  Page 1
